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In addition to spurring the creation and publication of
new expression, copyright law contains built-in First
Amendment accommodations.... First, it distinguishes
between ideas and expression and make only the latter eli-
gible for copyright protection.... Second, the "fair use" de-
fense allows the public to use not only facts and ideas, but
also the expression itself in certain circumstances.'
[Ilt is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining
the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted
to authors and inventors in order to give the public appro-
priate access to their work product.. . . [Tihis task in-
volves the difficult balance between the interests of
authors and inventors ... and society's competing interest
in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce.... 2
PROLOGUE
Copyright law exists in balance with patent and competition
law, and with First Amendment protection of expression. It cre-
ates limited exclusive rights in original expression, channels ideas
and their application into patent law and its more stringent
requirements for protection, and respects limited state trade
secret law protection of unpatented ideas and their utilization.
Like patent law, copyright creates statutory exceptions to the
national policy favoring freedom to compete. 3 Unlike patent law, it
1. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 788-89 (2003) (citations omitted).
Among the omitted citations are two statutory references, the Court's refer-
ence of the first statement to § 102(b) and the second statement to § 107 of
the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 107 (2000). The First Amendment and
copyright law relationship is examined in a number of recent articles. See,
e.g., Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional
Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (2003);
William W. Van Alstyne, Reconciling What the First Amendment Forbids
with What the Copyright Clause Permits: A Summary Explanation and Re-
view, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225 (2003); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locat-
ing Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001).
The classic reconciliation of copyright and the First Amendment is Melville
B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970) (developing what is often
termed the "Nimmer exoneration").
2. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984).
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icy favoring freedom to compete.3 Unlike patent law, it carves lim-
ited exceptions to the First Amendment protection of freedom of
expression "to promote the Progress of Science and the Useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors... the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings.. . ."4 This Article focuses on
copyright and contract law, and secondarily deals with patent and
trade secret law. Yet the opening quotations remind that all are
public purpose serving exceptions to overarching norms of freedom
of competition, freedom of expression, and freedom to use ideas,
facts and knowledge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc.5 began with Baystate
Technologies seeking a declaration that it did not infringe Bowers'
computer program template patent. Notoriety attached when the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, with one
judge dissenting, held on rehearing that § 301 of the Copyright
Act did not preempt state contract law enforcement of a standard
form shrink-wrap license term prohibiting reverse engineering of
the computer program code.6
3. Unpatented ideas and innovations have been characterized by the
Supreme Court as "free for all to use" in competition or otherwise. Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 167 (1989); see also
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964). Many commen-
tators have discussed the competition-limiting effects and purpose of the sub-
ject matter of this article; contractual prohibition of computer program code
reverse engineering. See, e.g., Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Property Law
and the Economics of Preemption, 76 IOWA L. REV. 959 (1991); Charles R.
McManis, Intellectual Property Protection and Reverse Engineering of Com-
puter Programs in the United States and the European Community, 8 HIGH
TECH. L.J. 25 (1993); David McGowan, Free Contracting, Fair Competition
and Article 2B: Some Reflections on Federal Competition Policy, Information
Transactions, and "Aggressive Neutrality," 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1173
(1998); David A. Rice, Digital Information As Property and Product: U.C.C.
Article 2B, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 621, 631, 637 (1997); Pamela Samuelson &
Susan Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE
L.J. 1575, 1630 (2002).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
5. 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2588 (2003).
6. The decision superceded and vacated the court's prior and unanimous
opinion at 320 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Judge Timothy B. Dyk dissented
from the court's opinion on rehearing solely on the issue of whether the con-
tract term was preempted by § 301(a) of the Copyright Act. Bowers, 320 F.3d
at 1335.
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Federal courts, including the Federal Circuit, consistently
hold that making unauthorized copies of a computer program as a
necessary step in reverse engineering a computer program by de-
compilation of its object code 7 is a fair use under § 107 of the
Copyright Act.8 The Bowers majority acknowledged this, but held
that a copyright owner may circumvent it by including in a stan-
dard form shrink-wrap license a term that negates reliance on
§ 107 to insulate computer program code by using any of several
reverse engineering methods. Judge Timothy B. Dyk, dissenting,
objected that this vitiated § 107, rendered null § 30 1 (a) preemp-
tion of state law that created rights equivalent to the limited ex-
clusive rights created by the Copyright Act, and sanctioned
standard form contract amendment of the scope of copyright as
legislated in § 102(b).9 The United States Supreme Court subse-
quently denied Baystate's certiorari petition. 10
This Article faults the Bowers majority's reasoning on several
counts. First, although correctly looking to U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit decisions for guidance, the jurisdiction from
which the trial court decision was appealed," it over-broadly mis-
7. Computer programs are authored in a programming language. This
initial writing consists of statements and instructions in terms readable by
humans trained in use of the language. This "source code" then must be
translated by an assembler or compiler program into binary machine read-
able "object code" before it can be used in or with a computer. See Andrew
Johnson-Laird, Software Reverse Engineering in the Real World, 19 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 843, 856-59 (1994). Decompilation or disassembly requires
making computer program copies in order to subject program object code to
analysis and reconstruction of the equivalent, though not exact, original
source code. These are characterized as "intermediate" copies. See Sony Com-
puter Entm't Corp. v. Connectix, Inc., 203 F.3d 596, 599-600 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 871 (2000).
8. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir.
1992). See infra note 19 for additional cases. The "fair use" characterization
makes the unauthorized reproduction of a computer program, otherwise an
infringement of a copyright owner's exclusive § 106(a) reproduction right, a
privileged and non-infringing act. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
9. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1335 (concurring in part, dissenting in part) (dis-
sent limited to Copyright Act preemption issue).
10. Baystate Techs., Inc. v. Bowers, 123 S. Ct. 2588 (2003). Subsequent
thereto, the Federal Circuit issued an order granting a motion to voluntarily
dismiss the appeal. No. 02-1078, 2003 WL 21675702 (Fed. Cir. Jul. 01, 2003).
11. The Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction in patent law
matters under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (2000). The Federal Circuit applied the
law as articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
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applied that law. Second, its use of case law was in some instances
highly selective, superficial and even misleading. Third, it com-
pounded these errors when it held that state contract law may be
employed to circumvent one provision of the federal Copyright Act
that explicitly narrows the statute-created exclusive rights of a
copyright owner set forth in another section of the Act. Fourth, it
paid no heed to the two ultimate consequences of its decision. The
most important consequence was that state contract law was per-
mitted to expand the scope of copyright by shielding subject mat-
ter that § 102(b) of the Copyright Act expressly excludes from
protection by a copyright. Related thereto, its decision is precedent
for other situations in which standard form contract terms purport
to negate other Copyright Act scope of protection, copyright owner
rights, and non-owner privileges provisions. Last, but not least, it
did not recognize that it effectively sanctioned use of standard
form license terms to amend state trade secret law, a state rather
than a federal law question.
This article deals with an additional issue not addressed by
the court. Closely related to § 102(b)'s indirect evisceration, the
court's decision permits state contract law to create by non-
negotiated standard form license terms the equivalent of patent-
like protection without regard to patent law conditions or limits.
This is distinct from creating enhanced copyright protection by
sanctioning standard form contract term circumvention of § 107
fair use as an express limitation on copyright owner statutory
rights. Its relationship to copyright is that the collateral effect is
the blunting of the letter and underlying policy of § 102(b) and its
codification of long-established limits on the scope of copyright vis
a vis patent and trade secret law, and altogether unprotected pub-
lic domain subject matter. This begs consideration of Bonito Boats,
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.12 as requiring patent law or per-
haps non-statutory copyright preemption of state contract law
when it is used to insulate subject matter that is, first, unpatented
and, second, excluded from protection by copyright. 13
the circuit in which the action was brought, in deciding questions not con-
cerning the Patent Act. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1322-23.
12. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
13. Baystate briefly presented the issue for the first time in its Reply
Brief in the original appeal. Appellant's Corrected Reply Brief at 19-20 (No.
01-1108, -1109), available at http://www.mucow.com/bowers/Reply.pdf (last
59920041
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This Article thus concerns two questions.14 The first is the
soundness and precedential importance of the Bowers majority
opinion concerning Copyright Act preemption of state contract
law. Specifically, this inquiry is whether and, if so, to what extent
the Copyright Act permits utilization of state contract law to cir-
cumvent statutory provisions that narrow copyright owner rights
and thereby expand the scope of copyright protection in copyright
subject matter. The second issue is whether state contract law en-
forcement of such terms is independently subject to constitutional
Supremacy Clause 15 preemption based on conflict with the Patent
and Copyright Clause' s and federal legislation.
II. BOWERS V. BAYSTATE
Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton of the U.S. District Court of Mas-
sachusetts ruled, after a jury verdict for Bowers, on issues involv-
ing the contract and copyright intersection. In particular, he dealt
with whether the damages awarded by the jury for copyright in-
fringement and breach of contract were duplicative in that the
underlying claims were based on the same facts.' 7 Judge Gorton
determined that there was duplication and limited Bowers to the
recovery of contract damages. He also denied Baystate's motion
for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new
trial. Baystate appealed the denial of its motions and Bowers
cross-appealed the denial of copyright damages.' s The copyright
and contract intersection issue was recast on appeal as whether
visited January 23, 2004). Bowers argued in its opposition to Baystate's peti-
tion for rehearing that conflict preemption had been waived because it was
not presented in Baystate's original brief. Bower's Opposition to Baystate's
Combined Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 15 (No.
01-1108, -1109), available at http://www.mucow.com/bowers/RehearingOppo-
sition (last visited January 23, 2004) [hereinafter Bower's Opposition to Re-
hearing Brie/I.
14. As noted in the Prologue, I do not independently discuss the potential
First Amendment issue that was not treated by the parties, the trial court, or
the appeals court.
15. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause)
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (Patent and Copyright Clause, the source
of federal policy).
17. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 185, 186 (D. Mass.
2000), affd, 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2588
(2003).
18. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1322.
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the Copyright Act preempted enforcement of a standard form
computer program copy use license term that forbade reverse en-
gineering of Bowers' computer program.
Bowers presented for the first time in an appellate court the
question of whether state contract law could be drawn upon to
prohibit a judicially-recognized limitation on the copyright owner's
§ 106 exclusive rights, a limited fair use privilege under § 107 to
reverse engineer a computer program. 19 The evidence that Bay-
state used reverse engineering consisted of a combination of an
admission that Baystate had observed the operation of Bowers'
program in order to ascertain how it functioned and expert wit-
ness comparative analysis of Bowers' and Baystate's computer
programs. 20 Initially, the court unanimously ruled that § 301(a) of
the Copyright Act did not preempt enforcement. 21 After rehearing,
the panel reaffirmed its decision, but with one panel member dis-
senting on the ground that § 301(a) preempted the contract claim.
Baystate argued that § 106 expressly renders copyright owner
rights subject to § 107, which states that an otherwise infringing
act that is found to be a "fair use" under § 107 is not an infringe-
ment.22 Asserting that Baystate's conduct was lawful under § 107,
19. E.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir.
1992); Sony Computer Entm't Corp. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602
(9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 871 (2000); DSC Communications Corp.
v. Pulse Communications Corp., 170 F.3d 1354, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (curi-
ously, discussing only Sega v. Accolade and not even citing the Federal Cir-
cuit's own Atari v. Nintendo decision); DSC Communications v. DGI Techs.,
Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 1996); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. In-
dus., 9 F.3d 823, 839-40 (10th Cir. 1993); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79
F.3d 1532, 1539-40 n.18 (11th Cir. 1996); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49
F.3d 807, 817-18 (1st Cir. 1996) (Boudin, J. concurring), aff/d, 516 U.S. 233
(1996); Vault v. Quaid, 847 F.2d 255, 264 (5th Cir. 1988); Alcatel USA, Inc. v.
DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 786 (5th Cir. 1999).
20. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1326-27. The particular "reverse engineering"
method is one of the most limited and least intrusive. The most extensive, in-
trusive and expensive is decompilation or disassembly of computer program
code. See Johnson-Laird, supra note 7, at 856-59; Sony Computer Entm't
Corp., 203 F.3d at 596, 599-600 (citing and discussing Johnson-Laird's identi-
fication of various methods and their characteristics and costs). Decompila-
tion and disassembly require making one or more computer program copies
in order to subject program code to analysis. These are commonly character-
ized by courts and others as "intermediate" copies.
21. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1334.
22. Id. at 1323. Section 106 states in relevant part: "Subject to sections
107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive
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it claimed that § 301(a) barred judicial enforcement of the contract
term it effectively created through state law - a right greater than
or at least equivalent to a § 106 exclusive right. Baystate's logic
was that § 301(a) preempts state contract law when it is used to
revive a copyright owner's § 106 exclusive right that § 107 makes
unenforceable. The effect is to permit contract-based creation of
the unqualified equivalent of a § 106 right and to invite use of con-
tract by others to privately amend the Copyright Act in other ways
in order to simultaneously claim the private rights and gain relief
from limitations that secure public benefits of copyright law.23
The Federal Circuit, on rehearing and denial of a petition for
rehearing en banc, held with one dissent that enforcement of the
contract term was not preempted. While reaffirming its prior
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.24 holding that
making unauthorized copies essential to reverse engineer com-
puter program code is a fair use in certain circumstances, it con-
cluded that § 301(a) did not preempt enforcement of a shrink-wrap
license term that prohibited what § 107 otherwise authorized. 25
The Bowers majority concluded that the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, the law of which the Federal Circuit was required to apply
on issues other than patent law, would reach the same conclu-
sion.26 The foundation of its decision was the much criticized Sev-
enth Circuit ruling in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg27 that § 301(a) of
the Copyright Act does not preempt state contract law and rights
created thereunder. 28
Judge Timothy B. Dyk vigorously and soundly argued in dis-
sent that Data General v. Grumman Systems, the First Circuit
rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copy-
righted work in copies or phonorecords; .... ." 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). Correla-
tively, § 107 states, in relevant part: "Notwithstanding the provisions of
sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use
by reproduction in copies or phonorecords... is not an infringement of copy-
right." Id. § 107.
23. 320 F.3d at 1323.
24. 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
25. 320 F.3d at 1325.
26. Id. at 1325-26.
27. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
28. 320 F.3d at 1325. This conclusion was based on the court's reasoning
from the quite different, and not controlling, decision in Data Gen. Corp. v.
Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994), that a trade se-
cret law claim was not preempted on the facts of the case.
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case relied upon by the majority, undertook deeper analysis than
that undertaken by the Bowers majority. It prescribed considera-
tion of whether the state law was equivalent in substance once
that it is found that the elements of the state law and copyright
claims differed.29 In addition, Judge Dyk was persuaded that the
majority's rote reliance on ProCD was indefensible. He noted that
even ProCD admitted a rare possibility of contract preemption
where a term "interfere[d] with the attainment of national objec-
tives" 30 and then addressed whether Bowers was among the excep-
tional cases. His lodestars were the purposes, policies and
objectives of Congress in enacting § 301(a) and, more generally,
national policies underlying patent and copyright law. 31 Congress,
he concluded, expressed important national policy in enacting
§ 107, legislating in § 106 and § 107 that the copyright owner
rights are subject to fair use as an affirmative defense, and declar-
ing that § 301(a) made the Copyright Act the exclusive source of
protection for copyright works. 32
Judge Dyk's national policy discussion drew upon the Su-
preme Court decision in Bonito Boats,33 a case involving Suprem-
acy Clause conflict preemption of state law that conflicted with
federal patent law policy.34 Bonito Boats strongly reaffirmed the
principle first announced twenty-five years earlier in Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 35 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Bright Light-
ing Co.36 that state law is preempted if it protects innovations "by
substantially restricting the public's ability to exploit ideas which
the patent system mandates shall be free for all to use."37 Consid-
ering that the majority decision not only negated the express
cross-references between sections 106 and 107, but indirectly ex-
panded the scope of copyright under § 102, Judge Dyk concluded
that enforcement of the standard form contract reverse engineer-
ing prohibition was preempted under § 301(a) in accordance with
29. 320 F.3d at 1335 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
30. 86 F.3d at 1455.
31. 320 F.3d at 1337-38 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 1335-36 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
33. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 167
(1989).
34. Id. at 1335 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
35. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
36. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
37. Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 167.
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the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software
Ltd.3s Like the majority, he did not address whether, under Bonito
Boats, enforcement was constitutionally preempted under the Su-
premacy Clause based on a conflict between state law and federal
patent or copyright law and policy as expressed in the Patent and
Copyright Clause and federal legislation.
III. BOWERS V. BAYSTATE ANTECEDENTS
A. Reverse Engineering of Computer Program Copy Code as a
Fair Use
Reverse engineering of computer programs by various meth-
ods - including decompilation or disassembly of machine readable
computer program code, or object code, in order to ascertain ele-
ments not protected by copyright - constitutes a § 107 "fair use."39
The Bowers majority acknowledged that the Federal Circuit itself
so held in Atari Games v. Nintendo.40 Review of other federal court
38. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
His conclusion followed a reference to Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.,
and its quotation from the 1964 decision of the Supreme Court in Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., that state law, including common law, is preempted where state
law "touched upon an area' of federal copyright law" in such a way as to cre-
ate a conflict with federal copyright law and policy. Id. (quoting 847 F.2d 255,
269-70 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Sears, Roebuck, 376 U.S. at 229)). Judge Dyk
met the argument that there is a significant difference between state legisla-
tion and contract law as follows:
From a preemption standpoint, there is no distinction between a
state law that explicitly validates a contract that restricts reverse
engineering (Vault) and general common law that permits such a re-
striction (as here). On the contrary, the preemption clause of the
Copyright Act makes clear that it covers "any such right or equiva-
lent right in any such work under the common law or the statutes of
the State."
Id.
39. See supra note 11. Decompilation or disassembly requires making
"intermediate" unauthorized copies of the computer program and is the prin-
cipal focus of previously decided cases. This method was not used by Bay-
state, but reverse analysis even by observation and making notes on the
operation of Bowers' program was found by the Bowers majority to constitute
reverse engineering within the broadly stated prohibition in Bowers' stan-
dard form license agreement. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1326.
40. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1325; see also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of
Am., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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decisions indicates unanimity of view on this point.41 Courts have
generally confined rejection of the fair-use defense to case-specific
determinations where the parties invoking § 107 in support of de-
compilation or disassembly have not met their burden. 42
Differentiation of program elements that constitute original
expression protected under § 102(a) of the Copyright Act4 3 and
elements excluded from protection of a copyright by § 102(b)44 or-
dinarily requires either unprotected element disclosure by the
copyright owner or independent study of the computer program.
The facts in Bowers indicate that Baystate used the least intrusive
means, repeated observation of operations performed by Bowers'
program. The most effective, intrusive and expensive means re-
quires making copies of the original and subjecting them to de-
compilation or disassembly of their object code, a process that
ordinarily involves making a number of additional and unauthor-
ized copies. 45 Proceeding cautiously, the earliest decisions held
that resort to program code decompilation was permissible when
41. See supra note 19.
42. See, e.g., DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc.,
170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (reverse engineering may be a fair use, but the
computer program copy that is decompiled must be one that was owned or
lawfully acquired).
43. Section 102(a) states, in part, that "[clopyright protection subsists...
in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expres-
sion.., from which they can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communi-
cated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 102(a) (2000).
44. Section 102(b) provides, in full, that "[iun no case does copyright pro-
tection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure,
process, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of
the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work." 17 U.S.C.A. §102(b) (2000). The leading computer program copyright
infringement case dealing with filtering out matter excluded from copyright
protection by § 102(b) is Computer Assocs. Int'l Corp. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d
693 (2d Cir. 1992). The basic approach has since been generally followed but
in some instances with modification, the latter epitomized by Gates Rubber
Co. v. Bando Chemical Indus., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993). See also Lotus
Dev. Corp. v. Borland Intl, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd, 516 U.S.
233 (1996) (section 102(b) excludes methods of operation from the protection
of a computer program copyright).
45. Sony Entm't Corp. v. Connectix, Inc., 203 F.3d 596, 599-601 (9th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 871 (2000); see also Johnson-Laird, supra note 7,
at 856-57 (describing the alternative methods and explaining by example the
steps involved in reverse engineering using code decompilation or disassem-
bly).
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necessary to further a legitimate purpose, the sought information
was unprotected by copyright under § 102(b), and the information
was neither disclosed nor otherwise available. 46
Each reproduction of computer program code not authorized
by the copyright owner infringes the copyright owner's § 106(a)
exclusive right to reproduce, or authorize the reproduction, of a
copyright work. Yet § 106 expressly states that the exclusive
rights created by that section are subject to the limitations legis-
lated in sections 107 to 120 of the Copyright Act.47 Reciprocally,
§ 107 etches that any unauthorized act that violates a § 106 exclu-
sive right of the copyright owner does not infringe if it is found to
be a fair use.48
The two sections, read together, integrally establish copyright
owners' exclusive rights and one of their general limitations. 49 Dis-
quieting as this may be to some computer program copyright own-
ers, it is no anomaly. It tracks more than a century of judicial
development of fair use as a direct limitation on copyright owner
rights. 50 Legislatively, it is the ultimate product of many years of
debate and negotiation preceding enactment of the 1976 Act. 51 No-
tably, fair use and its § 107 codification is regarded as one of the
principal copyright law accommodations of the First Amend-
ment.5 2 Finally, and contrary to its treatment by the Bowers ma-
jority, fair use in copyright law fundamentally protects the
46. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc. 977 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (9th Cir.
1992); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed.
Cir. 1992); Sony Entm't Corp. v. Connectix, Inc., 203 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 871 (2000).
47. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
48. See id. §§ 106, 107, 120.
49. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters. Inc., 471 U.S. 539,
560 (1985); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
431 (protection given to copyright is wholly statutory), 433 (non-infringer is a
person authorized to use copyright work pursuant to § 106 or who makes a
fair use pursuant to § 107), 433 (not all reproductions are within exclusive
domain of copyright owner because any person may reproduce a work for fair
use; "the copyright owner does not possess the exclusive right to such a use").
50. See generally WILLIAM PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT
LAw 19-62 (1985); Pierre N. Leval, Toward A Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1105, 1107-10 (1990).
51. See generally PATRY, supra note 50, at 261-365.
52. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 789 (2003); Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 560.
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general public rather than "property rights of individual par-
ties."53
B. Contractual Restriction of Computer Program Copy Use
Standard form shrink-wrap, and more recent click-wrap and
web-wrap, documents are self-characterized as licenses to use a
copy of a computer program, digital database, or other digital
product copy. Most include terms and conditions that define per-
mitted and prohibited uses and acts. Although originally devel-
oped and employed to contractually leverage state trade secret law
at a time when federal copyright protection for computer pro-
grams was in doubt and federal patent law protection for com-
puter programs was generally regarded as unavailable,54 vendor-
drafted standard forms expanded in scope and purpose upon the
advent and then widening use of personal computers. Computer
program copy licenses 55 usually include terms and conditions that
prohibit or restrict copy use or transfer, and as in Bowers, reverse
engineering of the computer program object code.
Other commonly used terms serve to price discriminate be-
tween market segments.56 The business method makes the same
product available solely for consumer or personal non-commercial
use at one price and business or other commercial use at a sub-
stantially higher price. Arbitrage is foreclosed by a term that pro-
hibits the transfer of a non-commercial use copy to a commercial
53. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
54. David A. Rice, Licensing the Use of Computer Program Copies and the
Copyright Act First Sale Doctrine, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 157, 157-59 (1990);
Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrink-wrap Licenses, 68 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 1239, 1243-44 (1995); see also, Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse
Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 96 n.7 (3d Cir. 1991); Softman Prods., LLC v. Adobe Sys.,
Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (citing expert declaration
prepared by the article's author as a retained expert for Softman Products,
LLC).
55. The more common, but legally imprecise, characterization of the
transaction subject matter is "software" and the documents as "software li-
censes." The author does not use that convention because it fails to distin-
guish between ownership of copyright and a copy, and resulting rights, a
distinction made clear by § 202 of the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000).
56. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996) (de-
scribing the practice and how it works); see also Michael J. Meurer, Copyright
Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOzo L. REv. 55 (2001).
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use or to a third party commercial purpose user. Price discrimina-
tion obviates more costly resort to functional differentiation by
creating two different versions of a computer program or database
product, one less robust and lower-priced than the other.
C. Enforceability of Shrink-Wrap License Terms Under State
Contract Law
The enforceability of copy-use license terms continues to in-
spire vigorous debate. Specific to shrink-wrap licenses and terms,
the most prominent state contract law issue concerns the legal ef-
fect of terms not accessible until after paying for and taking pos-
session of a shrink-wrapped package containing those terms as
well as the product.57
The most significant judicial responses are federal court deci-
sions applying and interpreting state law. All agree that the gov-
erning law is Article 2: Sales of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) as enacted by the relevant state.5 8 The two earliest deci-
sions, Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology59 and Ari-
zona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc.,60 held on their
57. These have come to be known as "money now, terms later" or "pay
first, terms later" transactions. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d
1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 522 U.S. 888 (1997); Klocek v. Gate-
way, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1336-37 (D. Kan. 2000); O'Quin v. Verizon
Wireless, 256 F. Supp. 2d 512, 516 (M.D. La. 2003). Related issues have since
been raised concerning click-wrap and web-wrap contract formations and
terms. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Communications, Inc., 306 F.3d 17 (2d
Cir. 2002); I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328
(D. Mass. 2002); Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd, 170 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Cal.
2000).
58. See Advent Sys. Ltd v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 676 (3d Cir. 1991);
Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 98 (3d Cir. 1991);
ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1450; Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332,
1336-37 (D. Kan. 2000); Softman Prods., LLC v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F.
Supp. 2d 1075, 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2001); M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline
Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 310 (2000); cf. Specht v. Netscape Communica-
tions, Inc., 306 F.3d 17, 30 n.13 (2d Cir. 2002).
59. Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 100 (applying Pennsylvania or Georgia law,
both of which were the official text of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code).
60. 831 F. Supp. 759, 765 (D. Ariz. 1993) (applying Georgia law). There
were several contracts at issue in Arizona Retail. The court held that the first
did include the disputed terms because Arizona Retail did not enter into a
contract until after it received a trial copy of the computer program, along
with the shrink-wrap terms. It is with respect to subsequent orders placed by
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facts that offer and acceptance occurred and resulted in contract
formation prior to product delivery and sending an invoice. Both
cases involved telephonic placement and acceptance of an order
followed by product shipment and sending an invoice. The dis-
puted terms were contained in one instance inside the product
package while in the other they were printed on the invoice. The
key terms disclaimed implied warranties and limited remedies for
vendor's breach, something UCC Article 2 expressly permits sub-
ject to certain conditions.61
Step-Saver and Arizona Retail agreed that the terms were not
included in the contract at the time of contract formation.62 The
Third Circuit in Step-Saver, and the District Court for Arizona in
Arizona Retail, concluded that section 2-207 provided the applica-
ble rule.63 Both courts determined on the facts that, under section
2-207(1), a contract had been formed and that the terms in ques-
tion constituted proposals for addition subject to section 2-207(2)
rules governing whether the terms became part of the contract.4
Upon determining that the proposed terms would materially alter
the original agreement, both held that they were excluded by sec-
tion 2-207(2)(b).65
The picture changed in 1996 when the Seventh Circuit held in
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg66 that the trial judge erroneously
treated Step-Saver and Arizona Retail as persuasive authority in
her interpretation and application of Wisconsin's enactment of the
UCC. Judge Frank Easterbrook's opinion was footed in an initial
observation that it was sound business practice and beneficial to
consumers for "ProCD ... to engage in price discrimination, sell-
ing its database to the general public for personal use at a low
price ... while selling information to the trade for a higher
Arizona Retail that the court held that the contract was formed when the or-
ders were placed by telephone and accepted at that time by the vendor who
thereafter shipped the product in a shrink-wrap package that also contained
a shrink-wrap license agreement that included warranty and remedy limita-
tion terms.
61. U.C.C. §§ 2-316, 2-719 (2003).
62. Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 105; Arizona Retail, 831 F. Supp. at 766.
63. Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 98; Arizona Retail, 831 F. Supp. at 765.
64. Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 98-99; Arizona Retail, 831 F. Supp. at 766.
65. Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 105-06; Arizona Retail, 831 F. Supp. at 766.
66. ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1452 (applying Wisconsin law).
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price."67 The court clearly understood that the practice was de-
pendent on judicial validation of the personal-use-only term in
ProCD's shrink-wrap license as the means to control arbitrage. 68
Otherwise, a purchaser like Zeidenberg would be able to purchase
and use for commercial purposes the less expensive consumer use
product in lieu of purchasing the identical product for commercial
use at a higher price.
The Seventh Circuit focused on Step-Saver and Arizona Retail
decisions for the very different purpose of factually distinguishing
and substantively differentiating them. This was the first step in
finding legal support for ProCD's business method, reversing the
District Court determination that ProCD's terms and conditions
had not become enforceable under Wisconsin contract law, and
eventually holding that § 301(a) of the Copyright Act did not pre-
empt their enforcement. 69
Two fallacious legal assertions established the Seventh Cir-
cuit's foundation. The first, and transparently erroneous, was the
perfunctory and outcome-prescriptive transformation of the famil-
iar tenet that the offeror is the master of the offer and its terms 70
into "[a vendor, as master of the offer, may invite acceptance by
conduct, and may propose limitation of the kind of conduct that
constitutes acceptance." 71 Equally stunning was Judge Easter-
67. Id. at 1449.
68. Id. at 1450.
69. The opinion effectively nullified UCC rejection of the common law
"last shot" rule at least for cases in which a computer program or database
product is the transaction subject matter. Not long after, Judge Easterbrook
in Hill v. Gateway extended this override to ordinary sale of goods transac-
tions by the simple declaration that ProCD governed. Hill v. Gateway 2000,
Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808 (1997).
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 58 (1981).
71. ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1452. The sleight of hand transformation has
extraordinary implications. One example concerns the general rule that a
seller who advertises goods or services merely invites offers rather than
makes them. See, e.g., JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND
PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 2.6(e) (5th ed. 2003); JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY
ON CONTRACTS § 34A (4th ed. 2001). Inferentially, this makes the customer,
and particularly a consumer or end-user, ordinarily the offeror and the mas-
ter of the offer. ProCD necessarily indicates that the Seventh Circuit will
make the advertisement a mere invitation to make an offer, a customer's af-
firmative response also a mere invitation to make an offer or perhaps a "pro-
posal to deal," and the advertiser's affirmative response to the buyer's
invitation, or proposal, the offer. Strange as that is at common law, it will be
far more interesting to see if ProCD is consistently applied in the Seventh
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brook's assertion that section 2-207, and therefore Step-Saver and
Arizona Retail, were irrelevant because the ProCD transaction in-
volved only one printed form.72 Although the section does concern
the "battle of forms" phenomenon, its text in no way requires an
exchange of two forms, and an Official Comment to the section
makes clear that it is not so limited. 73 Many prior judicial deci-
sions in fact had applied section 2-207 on facts that involve a
telephone or other oral offer that was either accepted at the time
and then later confirmed in writing or accepted by a later writ-
ing.74 More generally, ProCD overlooked Wisconsin appellate court
decisions that had applied UCC section 2-207 to facts involving
Circuit and other states within which the ProCD characterization has been
cited and applied with approval when the case before the court is a substan-
tial commercial transaction. Being consistent will upend long-established
business understandings, expectations and practices. This presents a strong
challenge to Judge Easterbrooks's "practical legal reasoning."
The prevailing view concerning "self-service" or "off-the-shelf' sales
transactions of the kind epitomized by Zeidenberg's purchase is that on-shelf
presentation of the product is the offer, and acceptance is either payment at
checkout or removing the product from the shelf. If the latter, it is an accep-
tance subject to an implied condition to pay. See CALAMARI, supra, § 2.6(e);
MURRAY, supra, § 36B. This was the view adopted by Chief Judge Crabb in
the ProCD trial court. 908 F. Supp. 640, 651-52 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
72. ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1452. The surprise was not limited to UCC
and contract law scholars. See, e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d
1332, 1339 (D. Kan. 2000) (Vratil, J., declining to follow ProCD).
73. Official comment 1 to section 2-207, which was not considered in
ProCD, likewise states that the section applies in two types of situations, one
of which is when there is a single document that is a written acceptance or
confirmation that contains additional or different terms. Specifically, it reads:
"This section is intended to deal with two situations. The one is the written
confirmation, where an agreement has been reached either orally or by in-
formal correspondence and is followed by one or both of the parties sending
formal memoranda embodying the terms so far as agreed upon and adding
terms not discussed." U.C.C. § 2-207, cmt. 1 (2003).
74. The decisions included ones rendered by the Seventh Circuit. See
Advance Concrete Forms, Inc. v. McCann Constr. Specialties Co., 916 F.2d
412, 415 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying Wisconsin law and specifically quoting
Mid-South Packers, Inc. v. Shoney's, Inc., 761 F.2d 1117, 1123 (5th Cir. 1985)
and its interpretation of Mississippi's version of section 2-207 for the specific
point that only one writing is required); Schulze & Burch Bisquit Co. v. Tree
Top, Inc., 831 F.2d 709, 712-13, 715 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying Illinois law);
Northrup Corp. v. Litronic Indus., Inc., 29 F.3d 1173, 1177 (7th Cir. 1994)
(applying Illinois law). ProCD cited Northrup for the proposition that section
2-207 deals with "the exchange of incompatible forms" just before declaring
that section 2-207 was inapplicable because there was only one form in
ProCD. 86 F.3d at 1452.
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one form and cases indicating that terms provided after payment
and delivery, i.e., disclaimer of a statutorily implied warranty did
not become part of the parties' agreement.7 5
Section 2-207 modifies the common law "mirror image" rule
76
and declares that a contract is formed if a communication in re-
sponse to an offer manifests an intention to enter into a contract
and it is not "expressly made conditional on assent to the addi-
tional or different terms."77 Since the latter is rare, additional
terms ordinarily become proposals for addition and a particular
term becomes part of the agreement in transactions between mer-
chants if it is not excluded by one of three exceptions stated in
UCC section 2-207(2).78 An important implication is that, absent
75. See Air Prod. & Chem., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 206 N.W.2d
414, 421-23 (1973). More on point, an earlier Seventh Circuit decision apply-
ing Wisconsin law, Advance Concrete Forms, had stated by quotation from
the Fifth Circuit that section 2-207: "applies to the situations in which an
agreement has been previously reached either orally or by informal writings,
and one or both parties send written confirmation of terms discussed, adding
certain terms not discussed." 916 F.2d at 415; see also U.C.C. § 2-207, cmt. 1
(2003); Mid-South Packers, Inc. v. Shoney's, Inc., 761 F.2d 1117, 1123 (5th
Cir. 1985) (applying Mississippi's version of U.C.C. section 2-207); Waukesha
Foundry, Inc. v. Indus. Eng'g, Inc, 91 F.3d 1002, 1007-08 (7th Cir. 1996) (de-
cided after ProCD but before the Seventh Circuit's 1997 decision in Hill).
76. John E. Murray, Jr., The Definitive "Battle of Forms": Chaos Revis-
ited, 20 J.L. & CoM. 1, 5 (2000). The author agrees with Professor Murray's
statement that UCC section 2-207 modifies, not rejects, the mirror image
rule. But see Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 99 (3rd
Cir. 1991).
77. U.C.C. § 2-207(1). The aim is to recognize contemporary business
practices and what they imply about parties' usual intentions, and the reality
that standard forms seldom are read and responded to with emphasis on
their inclusion of additional or different terms. Remarkable, then, is that the
Seventh Circuit in Hill powerfully invoked the old chestnut of self-protection
responsibility of consumers to read contract terms and accept the risks atten-
dant in not doing so. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th
Cir. 1997). But see Licitra v. Gateway, Inc., 734 N.Y.S.2d 389, 393 (N.Y. Civ.
Ct. 2001) (treating the underlying assumption as unrealistic and characteriz-
ing Gateway's argument as the "Marie Antoinette 'let them eat cake' de-
fense").
78. UCC section 2-207(2) states:
The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to
the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the con-
tract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
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an express agreement, no additional terms become effective and
enforceable unless both parties are merchants.7 9 This presented
an insurmountable hurdle for the vendors in ProCD and later con-
sumer cases that have treated Judge Easterbrook's decision as au-
thoritative.80 Judge Easterbrook finessed this, preemptively
dismissing Step-Saver and Arizona Retail as authority with the
flat declaration that "lolur case has only one form; UCC section 2-
207 is irrelevant."1 He then turned to section 2-204(1) which
states "[a] contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner
sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties
which recognizes the existence of such a contract" 2 and overlaid
this with its deft and prudential transformation of "the offeror is
master of the offer" axiom into "[a] vendor, as master of the offer"
legal principle.8 3 It easily followed that the contract was not
formed by product selection and payment in exchange for goods in
a retail store because the offer, not just terms and conditions, were
contained within the vendor's shrink-wrapped box.84 This trans-
posed post-sale delivery of terms from raising a legal issue into a
substantial justification of the Seventh Circuit's result. The stage
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is
given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
U.C.C. § 2-207(2).
79. See Murray, supra note 76, at 33; Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F.
Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000).
80. The consequence in a straight-forward and precedent-guided applica-
tion of UCC section 2-207 is that the additional terms did not qualify as pro-
posals for addition to the terms upon which the parties had agreed and that
express agreement is required. See Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1341; U.S. Sur-
gical Corp. v. Orris, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1206 (D. Kan. 1998); Lemmer v.
IDS Props., Inc., 304 N.W.2d 864, 870-71 (Minn. 1980); MURRAY, supra note
71, § 50C, at 181.
Most of the cases, including ProCD, involve an end-user who was not a
merchant within the "merchant" definition of UCC section 1-104. See Specht
v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002); O'Quin v.
Verizon Wireless, 256 F. Supp. 2d 512 (M.D. La. 2003); K7ocek, 104 F. Supp.
2d 1332; Rinaldi v. Iomega Corp., 1999 WL 1442014 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 3,
1999); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998);
Licitra, 734 N.Y.S.2d 389; cf. I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp.,
183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002); M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline
Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000).
81. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).
82. Id. (quoting U.C.C. § 2-204(1)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1452-53.
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thus was set for addressing the next, federal law, issue of whether
§ 301(a) of the Copyright Act nevertheless preempted state law
and made the term unenforceable.
The preceding brief treatment of ProCD and its progeny is in
many respects unnecessary, but is important background to Bow-
ers and its reliance on ProCD's subsequent second stage preemp-
tion analysis. Bowers neither decided nor even remarked upon the
question of the enforceability of shrink-wrap and click-wrap li-
censes and their terms under Massachusetts law. As in ProCD,
enforceability under state law was necessary to the outcome in
Bowers, though hardly arguable in Bowers favor since at least one
Massachusetts decision had held in favor of the ProCD view of
state contract law.85 My limited purpose is to introduce the Bowers
and ProCD link as a foundation for a later discussion of the Bow-
ers' majority connection with and reliance upon ProCD in deciding
whether contract terms are subject to § 301(a) preemption.
IV. SECTION 301 AND STANDARD FORM SHRINK-WRAP
LICENSE TERMS
A. Legislative Background of§ 301
The Copyright Act of 1976 displaced the dual system of state
common law and federal statutory copyright protection with a uni-
fied and exclusive system of federal copyright legislation. Section
301(a) of the statute captured this by providing that:
[AIll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights with the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are
fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within
the scope of copyright as specified by section 102 and
103... are governed exclusively by this title. 86
85. See I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp 2d.
328, 337-38 (D. Mass. 2002) (applying Massachusetts Uniform Commercial
Code and adopting ProCD and its reasoning).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2002). Section 301(b)(1) correlatively declares that
state law and equity rules that do not create rights equivalent to those cre-
ated by federal law in copyright subject matter are not preempted.
§ 301(b)(1).
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Section 301, as enacted, supplanted original Senate bill lan-
guage that particularly specified state laws that were and were
not preempted. The original bill excluded, among other things,
rights created under state contract law.8 7 While the legislative his-
tory of the change is generally unilluminating, one critical factor
appears to have been Department of Justice concern that the
original Senate bill language sheltering rights created by state
misappropriation law was over-broad.88 In any event, the revised
§ 301 reflects a very different approach. It establishes the federal
law primacy in broad terms and leaves it to the courts to deter-
mine case-by-case the equivalency of state law rights and reme-
dies and federal statutory rights in copyright subject matter.8 9
B. Section 301 and State Contract Law and Rights
State contract law is the principal means for exercise and re-
alization of the economic benefits of copyright owner rights cre-
ated by the Copyright Act. Thus, for example, contract is used to
authorize others to reproduce or distribute copies in accordance
with § 106(a) and (b), and establish royalty or other payment
terms. This warrants judicial skepticism toward claims that
§ 301(a) preempts a state law contract right. Even so, congres-
sional abandonment of a blanket exclusion of contract rights in fa-
vor of the enacted § 301(a) compels case-by-case judicial
determination of equivalency. This has resulted in many reported
decisions dealing with whether particular contract terms, other-
wise enforceable under state law, create rights equivalent to those
created by federal copyright law.90
87. See David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy:
Federal Preemption of Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engi-
neering, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 543, 602-05 (1992); Lemley, Intellectual Property,
supra note 54, at 1269-74.
88. See Rice, Public Goods, supra note 87, at 602-05; Lemley, Intellectual
Property, supra note 54, at 1269-74; Paul Goldstein, Preempted State Doc-
trines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory Licenses: Testing the Limits of
Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1112-20 (1977).
89. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 494 U.S. 417,
448 (1984); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539,
560-62 (1985); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
90. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§1.01[BI[1] [a (2003).
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A sizable majority of the decisions have held that the term at
issue was not preempted.91 This is quite as one would expect. Con-
tract is the means for copyright owners' exploitation of limited
property rights through transfer of exclusive or non-exclusive
rights.92 Non-preemption usually is explained under an "extra
element" test, now the standard judicial benchmark for determi-
nation of whether a right created by state law is equivalent to one
created by the Copyright Act.93 This judicially-devised and non-
statutory tool directs a court to consider whether state contract or
other state law requires proof that a defendant did something ad-
ditional to that which must be shown in order to make out a claim
of copyright infringement. 94 Focusing on the contract law re-
quirement of a promise and proof of its breach, many cases con-
clude that a right created by state contract law was not equivalent
to one created by § 106 of the Copyright Act because contract in-
cludes an extra element; e.g., promise, mutual assent or consid-
eration.95
Judicial application often is quite pro forma. Many courts
overlook that the complete statement of the test recognizes that
the policy expressed in § 301 requires a court to consider whether
an identified extra element makes the state law claim one that is
qualitatively, not just technically, different.96 Concerning qualita-
tive difference, some courts properly focus more on conduct and
particularly whether the same conduct establishes both copyright
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. § 1.01[B][1].
94. See Wrench, LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 457 (6th Cir.
2001); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1164
(1st Cir. 1994); NIMMER, supra note 90, § 1.01[B] [1] [a].
95. See Wrench, LLC, 256 F.3d at 457; Data Gen. Corp., 36 F.3d at 1164;
NIMMER, supra note 90, § 1.01[BI[1][a].
96. Wrench, LLC, 256 F.3d at 457; Mayer v. Josiah Wedgewood & Sons
Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Kabehie v. Zoland, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 721, 728 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (distinguishing which contract claims
were, and were not, preempted). Each of the three cases cited by ProCD as
answering "no" to the question of whether § 301(a) preempted contract rights,
in fact, noted that qualitative difference is the ultimate consideration when
applying the extra element decision-aid and expressly limited themselves to
particular contract terms rather than contract in general. See Nat'l Car
Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 433 (8th Cir.
1993); Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir.
1990); Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926-27 (4th Cir. 1993).
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infringement and breach of contract or the same measure of dam-
ages. This approach rejects formalistic analysis in favor of ascer-
taining if the contract and copyright claims are substitutable, one
for the other. Although most hold as expected that contract usu-
ally is not preempted, others find preemption in particular con-
texts. The clearest instance of the latter is when the promise is to
not make a copy or distribute copies without obtaining copyright
owner authorization. In that instance, the exact same conduct es-
tablishes infringement and breach and the promise adds nothing
to the exclusive statutory rights of the copyright owner.97 Another
example makes clear, however, that even this change in focus does
not assure invariably correct outcomes. A promise to pay a royalty
for each distributed copy is breached if the required payments are
not made, and each copy that is distributed may infringe the
§ 106(3) distribution right because the copyright owner has ex-
pressly or impliedly conditioned her authorization to distribute
upon payment of the agreed royalty. The same conduct will estab-
lish both breach and infringement, but the contract clearly in-
cludes an extra element as neither the promise to pay nor the
amount to be paid is an independent, not merely extra, element
that truly is qualitatively different.
V. BOWERS, CONTRACT AND § 301(A):
A CRITIQUE AND REAPPRAISAL
A. Bowers and Contract
Bowers, like ProCD, depended on an initial determination - or
assumption in the case of Bowers - that the shrink-wrap license
was enforceable under state contract law. Beyond that, it con-
cluded that the facts presented no contract interpretation issue
because the contract term in Bowers broadly prohibited reverse
engineering of any kind.98 In this respect it differed from the
situation presented in Bonito Boats where the concern was with a
97. Wrench, LLC, 256 F.3d at 457 (finding no preemption on the facts,
but stating: "If the promise amounts only to a promise to refrain from repro-
ducing, performing, distributing or displaying the work, the contract claim is
preempted.").
98. 320 F.3d 1316, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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state statute that prohibited one, albeit the least costly, of several
available methods of reverse engineering.99
Finally, the majority directed its attention to whether Massa-
chusetts law would permit contractual waiver of a statutory right.
Implied was that a shrink-wrap license term "waiver" of a licen-
see's statutory fair-use right under § 107 would be unenforceable
if contrary to state law. If so, there would be no reason to consider
whether federal copyright law preempted state contract law.
After first expressing that "courts do not lightly set aside
freely-entered contracts" 10 0 and indicating that the term would be
enforceable under Massachusetts law, the majority launched into
its § 301(a) analysis. This consisted primarily of invoking ProCD
as distinguishing contract and property rights, citing a First Cir-
cuit decision indicating its adherence to the extra element test
when deciding if a state trade secret law cause of action was pre-
empted, 101 and listing ProCD and cases it relied upon as establish-
ing that § 301(a) "does not preempt state contract action in this
case" because "the Copyright Act does not preempt contractual
constraints on copyrighted articles." 102 Addressing and distin-
99. It is useful to recall at this point that decompilation of computer pro-
gram code is but one, albeit the most thorough and expensive, means for
computer program code reverse engineering.
100. 320 F.3d at 1323 (citing Beacon Hill Civic Ass'n v. Ristorante To-
scano, 662 N.E.2d 1015, 1017 (Mass. 1996)). Overall, cited Massachusetts au-
thority was limited to the following: (1) Beacon Hill Civic Ass'n, 662 N.E.2d at
1017, for the statement in a non-UCC case that courts "do not lightly set
aside freely-entered agreements," although the Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court in that case did set aside an agreement for the reason that it vio-
lated public policy; (2) several cases for the contract construction principle
that words that are free from ambiguity are to be taken in their ordinary or
usual sense; (3) Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 548 N.E.2d 182,
187 (Mass. 1990), for the proposition that "a contractual waiver of statutory
rights is permissible when the statute's purpose is 'the protection of the prop-
erty rights of individual parties... rather than.., the protection of the gen-
eral public."' Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1323, 1325-26 (quotation omitted). Not
noted was that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Canal Electric
emphasized that the case involved a negotiated commercial contract between
two commercially sophisticated parties for purchase of a turbine generator
and that Massachusetts law otherwise disfavored waiver in consumer cases
and required careful consideration of alleged rights waivers in other matters.
Canal Elec. Co., 548 N.E.2d at 185.
101. 320 F.2d at 1324 (citing Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support
Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1164 (1st Cir. 1994)) (quotation omitted).
102. Id.
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guishing Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd.,1°3 a Fifth Circuit de-
cision holding unconstitutional a Louisiana statute that made
shrink-wrap licenses and their terms enforceable, the Bowers ma-
jority contrasted private contract and a public law and concluded
that the First Circuit would not extend Vault "to include private
contractual agreements supported by mutual assent and consid-
eration" because the First Circuit "recognizes contractual waiver
of affirmative defenses and statutory rights."10 4 Finally, and at
last recognizing that Massachusetts 1 5 contract law governed, the
court spoke to contract construction in reading the shrink-wrap
term to broadly and unambiguously prohibit any and all methods
of reverse engineering, including Baystate's observation and
analysis of computer program operation rather than code decompi-
lation.106 The majority tersely concluded that the "First Circuit
would follow the reasoning of ProCD" based on its trade secret law
preemption decision in Data General0 7 and held that the Copy-
right Act did not preempt Bowers' contract claim.
As earlier noted, at least one decision of the U.S. District
Court for Massachusetts had predicted that Massachusetts courts
would follow ProCD and held a shrink-wrap license and its terms
enforceable as a matter of Massachusetts contract law.108 On the
other hand, no federal court or Massachusetts appellate decision
had dealt with the enforceability of a standard form shrink-wrap
license term that nullified a federal copyright law provision. Yet
there is substantial reason to believe that Massachusetts law it-
self might render such a contract term unenforceable as against
public policy. 0 9 If this had been considered, it might have made it
103. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
104. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1325.
105. Id. at 1325 (discussing Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d
255 (5th Cir. 1988)). Unremarked by the Bowers majority was that Vault con-
cerned a contract term that prohibited reverse engineering of computer pro-
gram code.
106. Id. at 1326. None of the cited cases were decided under Article 2:
Sales of the Massachusetts Uniform Commercial Code.
107. Id. at 1325.
108. I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328,
336 (D. Mass. 2002) (following ProCD on enforceability of clickwrap license
and its forum selection term).
109. See, e.g., Beacon Hill Civic Ass'n v. Ristorante Toscano, 662 N.E.2d
1015, 1018-19 (1996); Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 548
N.E.2d 182 (1990) (discussing unconscionability and unfair trade practices);
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unnecessary to take up the only contract-related issue that Bowers
actually addressed: whether § 301(a) preempted state contract law
enforcement of a term that is otherwise enforceable as a matter of
state law. 110
Judge Dyk limited his dissent to the question of whether
§ 301(a) preempted Baystate's contract claim. It was unnecessary
to speak to any state contract law issue or the majority's effort to
build state law support for its preemption analysis by showing
that it is permissible under Massachusetts law to contractually
waive a statutory right. Correctly perceiving the latter to be ir-
relevant to the federal law issue and otherwise assuming state
contract law enforceability of the standard form shrink-wrap li-
cense and its reverse engineering prohibition, he limited his atten-
tion to Baystate's argument that federal law preempted
enforcement of the particular term. Like the majority, he there fo-
cused solely on the second point in that inquiry, equivalency of
state and federal law rights, since it was beyond question that the
dispute involved rights in copyright subject matter."'
B. Bowers and § 301(a)
The Bowers majority recognized that "itlhe shrink-wrap
agreements in this case are far broader than the protection af-
forded by copyright law."" 2 At the same time, it rejected Bowers'
appeal from Judge Gorton's exercise of discretion to permit recov-
ery of contract and vitiate the jury's award of copyright damages
because they were duplicative. In so doing, however, the majority
reasoned that "the breach of contract damages arose from the
Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1165 (1st
Cir. 1993) (discussing misappropriation, intentional interference, and unfair
competitive conduct). Ironically, these are the cases relied upon by the major-
ity to establish enforceability of the term under Massachusetts law.
110. Mark Lemley also has noted the possibility of nonenforceability based
on state public policy grounds. See Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The
Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REv. 111, 163-67
(1999).
111. Section 301(a) does not apply unless it is shown that the dispute in-
volves copyright subject matter as defined in § 102 and alleged state law
creation of rights equivalent to those created by the Copyright Act in that
subject matter.
112. 320 F.3d at 1326.
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same copying and included the same lost sales that form the basis
for the copyright damages."113
The second statement strongly indicates that federal courts
ought to consider whether the same conduct or acts establish both
state and federal law liability when making their determination of
the equivalency of rights created by state law and federal copy-
right law." 4 This arguably is subsumed in the teaching that ele-
vating substance over form requires that an identified extra
element must be one that makes the state law claim qualitatively,
not just literally, different from a copyright claim.
The combination of the two quoted statements is striking. The
first statement proceeds from general recognition that contract in
many respects works hand-in-hand with copyright, and this is rec-
ognized by the Copyright Act and more generally in case law deal-
ing with exploitation of the economic value of copyright
ownership." 5 The second statement, on the other hand, admits
that in some instances the same conduct may establish both con-
tract breach and copyright infringement. Equivalency, under the
latter, exists only if it is exact unless the state law claim extra
element is but a sham. Otherwise, the first statement immunizes
113. Id. at 1328.
114. This was the approach actually followed by the First Circuit in Data
Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1164-65 (1st Cir.
1994) (state trade secret law creates extra element, but the court noted that
some cases have preempted trade secret claim and further examined whether
in this case the state law claim was qualitatively different). See also Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 1983);
Wrench, LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 447 (6th Cir. 2001), (disap-
proving ProCD view that contract is not preempted as a matter of law, but
concluding on the facts that a qualitative difference precluded preemption of
contract implied-in-fact claim); Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d
772, 777 (5th Cir. 1999) (state misappropriation claim preempted; although
an extra element present, not qualitatively different because same conduct
created liability under both federal copyright and state law); Kabehie v.
Zoland, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 731-35 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist. 2002) (distin-
guishing contract claims that were, and were not, preempted); Green v. Hen-
drickson Publishers, Inc., 770 N.E.2d 784, 789-90 (Ind. 2002) (ProCD harshly
criticized to extent it has been interpreted as holding that no state contract
law claim is preempted, ProCD and cases relied upon by it wrongly decided to
extent they support that broad proposition, and breach consisting of "continu-
ing to print additional copies of books covered by the 1985 agreement" was
preempted because it was the equivalent of § 106(1) unauthorized reproduc-
tion).
115. See NIMMER, supra note 90, § 1.01[B] [2] [c].
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all contract claims from federal preemption because contract in-
troduces an extra element, e.g., promise, consideration or assent.
The majority acknowledged the qualitative equivalency di-
mension of the extra element test, 116 but then immediately segued
to ProCD and a string citation of the cases it relied upon as estab-
lishing that mutual assent and consideration make contract
claims different from copyright claims. 17 Overlooked was that its
Data General quotation to show First Circuit adherence to the ex-
tra element test and the qualitative difference factor showed that
the First Circuit was itself quoting a prior decision in which a par-
ticular contract term was preempted by § 301(a)." 8 Also not noted
was that the qualitative difference criterion led the Data General
court to go beyond it to find an extra element and to closely exam-
ine its qualitative difference." 9
Bowers joined ProCD as one of only two federal appeals court
decisions that sanction use of standard form shrink-wrap licenses
and state contract law to redefine the scope of federal copyright, a
wholly statutory creation. ProCD knowingly permitted copy use
restrictions in a "money now, terms later" shrink-wrap license to
create better-than-copyright protection for database contents that
were copyright subject matter but neither protected by copyright
nor part of a compilation that had the modicum of originality nec-
essary for even thin copyright protection. The effect was to judi-
cially add a new right to the exclusive statutory rights of a
copyright owner, an extra-statutory power to control the use of
unprotected informational content.
Bowers vastly outdid ProCD. Facially, it concerned use of
state contract law to privately render rights created by § 106 no
longer subject to, currently, the most important computer program
fair use - decompilation. It did so with awareness that competi-
tion in the use of statutorily unprotected ideas, methods, processes
and the like was the term's real target. The harm claimed by
Bowers, and what he sought to remedy through shrink-wrap con-
116. 320 F.3d at 1324.
117. Id. at 1325.
118. Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
119. Data Gen. Corp., 36 F.3d at 1164-65 (holding that a court must con-
sider whether the extra element shows the existence of a qualitative differ-
ence because not every extra element does so).
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tract term enforcement, was that "Baystate's introduction of
Draft-Pak version 3 induced intense price competition between
Bowers and Baystate."120
Freeing Bowers of price competition by approving contractual
expansion of the limited statutory monopoly was antithetical to
both federal intellectual property and competition law. Copyright
and patent law carve, for utilitarian purposes, limited and inter-
est-balanced statutory exceptions to the overarching national pol-
icy favoring competition and freedom to compete. 121 Bowers
recognized that the contract term's purpose and effect was to sub-
stantively and substantially increase protection by copyright, and
regarded that as unremarkable if not in fact a "right" inherent in
ownership of copyright.
Judge Dyk vigorously challenged the majority's preemption
holding on three fronts. First, he asserted that market-wide use of
shrink-wrap licenses to gain efficiencies inherent in doing busi-
ness based on standard terms simply are not classic two-party
agreements of the kind posited by ProCD and the Bowers major-
ity.122 They operate across a relevant market consisting of all
product customers, not one-to-one as in the classic two-party bar-
gain paradigm evoked by ProCD and the majority.123 Judge Dyk
120. 320 F.3d at 1322. Judge Easterbrook in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg
similarly, approvingly, but mistakenly, stated that "[t]o the extent that li-
censes facilitate distribution of object code while concealing the source code
(the point of a clause forbidding disassembly), they serve the same procom-
petitive functions as does the law of trade secrets." 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th
Cir. 1996) (citing Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d
174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991)). Bonito Boats and Kewanee, in contrast, positively
presented reverse engineering as promoting competition by increasing
knowledge dissemination and use. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp, 416 U.S. 470,
489-90 (1974).
121. See generally Heald, supra note 3; J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Be-
tween the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432 (1994).
122. 320 F.3d at 1337 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
123. The difference has been widely noted and commented upon. Niva El-
kin-Koren, Copyrights in Cyberspace - Rights Without Laws?, 73 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1155, 1180-85 (1998); Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of
Shrink-wrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 512, 528-32 (1997);
Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property and the Costs of Commercial Ex-
change: A Review Essay, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1612-13 (1995); Maureen A.
O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82
MINN. L. REV. 609, 693 (1998); Rice, supra note 3, at 636-37. The distinction
also was noted and outcome critical in the principal Massachusetts cases re-
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underscored this by stating that he would accept Bowers' argu-
ment against preemption if the transaction had been negotiated. 124
Judge Dyk's second argument was firmly grounded in federal
copyright and patent law policy. He appraised the standard form
shrink-wrap agreement and its broad prohibition against reverse
engineering in light of the legislative and constitutional policy
foundations of § 301 and the broader expression of national policy
in Bonito Boats. 25 The Supreme Court's concern in the latter and
in its earlier decision in Kewanee was whether state trade secret
law, in Kewanee, and state legislation, in Bonito, overreached fed-
eral patent law and policy in contravention of the Court's earlier
Sears and Compco decisions. 26 Although the four decisions con-
cerned patent law and policy and their relationship to competition
policy, Judge Dyk looked particularly to Bonito Boats and Sears
and their conflict preemption teachings as a source of guidance in
dealing with copyright law statutory preemption.
Third, he concluded his opinion by declaring that the First
Circuit, the law of which the Federal Circuit must apply, was ac-
tually contrary to the majority's interpretation. Quoting Data
General, he concluded that the First Circuit would preempt a
lied upon by the Bowers majority in stating the First Circuit and Massachu-
setts law permit contractual waiver of statutory rights. See supra notes 100,
109; infra note 173.
124. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1336 (Dyk, J., dissenting). This sharply contrasts
with Judge Easterbrook's declaration in ProCD that standard form
shrink-wrap licenses and terms are especially well-suited to mass distribu-
tion and, therefore, particularly justify enforcement under state law and im-
munity from § 301(a) preemption. ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1455. The most
obvious reason for the difference is that ProCD at least facially concerned
vendor realization of the full benefits of distribution control and market dif-
ferentiation by price discrimination whereas Bowers dealt with use of con-
tract to defeat a judicially recognized § 107 limitation on the most
fundamental copyright owner right, the right to reproduce copies of the origi-
nal work. As noted at various points, however, both dealt with contractual
alteration of the statute-defined scope of copyright. Bowers is simply more
transparent and overreaching in this regard.
125. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1335-36.
126. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp, 416 U.S. 470, 479-80 (1974); Bo-
nito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989). Both
cases involved Supremacy Clause preemption based on state law conflict with
federal patent law and policy. Id. Bonito included extensive discussion in-
tended to put to rest any idea that the Court had backed away from its
broadly stated conflict preemption holdings in Sears and Compco. Bonito
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 154-59.
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shrink-wrap license term that prohibited reverse engineering be-
cause the extra element of agreement "merely concerns the extent
to which authors and their licensees can prohibit unauthorized
copying by third parties."127 Aside from his Data General quota-
tion, three points framed his analysis. The first was that "Con-
gress made the Copyright Act the exclusive means for protecting
copyright" in § 301(a). 128 Speaking to the policy intention to occupy
the field by making federal law the exclusive source of protection
for expressive works, he drew upon Bonito Boats, stating that:
"The test for preemption by copyright law, like the test for patent
law preemption, should be whether the state law 'substantially
impedes the public use of the otherwise unprotected' material."129
Noting that § 102(b) excludes from copyright protection the
subject matter that reverse engineering is used to discover, he
faulted approval of state contract law as a shield against public
use of computer program content which the section expressly de-
nies protection by a program's copyright.130
Referring to Eldred v. Ashcroft1l as the most recent expres-
sion of authority for applying patent precedent in copyright cases,
Judge Dyk reminded that Bonito Boats reaffirmed the Sears hold-
ing that the Supremacy Clause dictates preemption of state law
that "substantially restrict[ed] the public's ability to exploit ideas
that the patent system mandates shall be free for all to use." 132 Fi-
127. Bowers, 320 F.2d at 1317 (quoting Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys.
Support, 36 F.3d 1147, 1165 (1st Cir. 1994)) (emphasis in original Data Gen.
Corp. opinion).
128. Id. at 1335.
129. Id. (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 157, 167).
130. Id. at 1336.
131. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 779 (2003).
132. Bowers, 320 F.2d at 1335 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,
376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1964)) (editing is that of Judge Dyk). He might have
further noted that Sears spoke about both copyright and patent preemption
of state law that intruded upon a federal right to copy in stating:
Pursuant to this constitutional authority, Congress in 1790 enacted
the first federal patent and copyright law.., and ever since that
time has fixed the condition upon which patents and copyrights shall
be granted.... These laws, like other laws of the United States en-
acted pursuant to constitutional authority, are the supreme law of
the land.... When state law touches upon the area of these federal
statutes, it is "familiar doctrine" that the federal policy "may not be
set at naught, or its benefits denied" by the state law. Sola Elec. Co.
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delity to this principle was best shown, in his view, by Data Gen-
eral and other decisions that rigorously employ an "equivalent in
substance" test in case-by-case determination of § 301(a) preemp-
tion. He buttressed this by quoting from Data General to make
clear that § 301(a) states the applicable law and that the extra
element test is but a non-statutory, judicially-fashioned decision-
making aid derivative of the statutory standard of equivalence in
substance.133
The third frame was that Atari and other decisions consis-
tently established that even making unauthorized copies incident
to decompilation or disassembly of computer program code is a fair
use in at least some instances. The Bowers majority did speak to
this, but in a curious way it observed that it "left untouched the
conclusions reached in Atari Games v. Nintendo regarding reverse
engineering as a statutory fair use exception to copyright in-
fringement." 134 While it further stated that a "prohibition on all
copying whatsoever would stifle the free flow of ideas without
serving any legitimate interest of the copyright holder," it con-
cluded that a standard form shrink-wrap license prohibition
against reverse engineering was not preempted because contract
requires proof of an element additional to what must be shown to
prove infringement. 135
Judge Dyk would have none of this. He fixed his focus by
quoting the court's declaration in Atari that: "An author cannot
acquire patent-like protection by putting an idea, process or
method of operation into an unintelligible format and asserting
v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 172, 173, 176, 63 S. Ct. 172, 173, 87
L.Ed. 165 (1942). [other citations omitted].
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 228-29.
133. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1324 (quoting Data Gen. Corp., 36 F.3d at 1164,
1165).
134. Id. at 1325.
135. Id. Is this a non sequitur? If so, it is not a product of my creatively
patching together two unrelated statements that happen to appear on the
same page of the opinion. The intimation is that a contract term could not
wholly circumvent § 107 by prohibiting unauthorized reproduction, but that
presents difficulties for counsel and other courts in determining what the
Federal Circuit would permit and not permit contract to do with respect to
the operation of § 107.
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copyright infringement against those who try to understand that
idea, process, or method of operation."136
Invoking § 102(b) and its exclusion of ideas, processes, meth-
ods of operation and certain other subject matter from protection
by a copyright, he presented the computer program reverse engi-
neering fair use defense as an essential element of federal copy-
right law. It was this exemption that assured that copyright
protection would not be extended "to any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery...
embodied in such work."137 Thus, he concluded that "[a] state is
not free to eliminate the fair use defense" because "[eInforcement
of a total ban on reverse engineering would conflict with the Copy-
right Act itself by protecting otherwise unprotectable material."1 38
Judge Dyk correctly observed that validating a shrink-wrap
term prohibiting reverse engineering goes deeper than unburden-
ing copyright owner rights of an express statutory limitation.139
The contract term privately amends the cornerstone of the Copy-
right Act, its two-part § 102 definition of the subject matter and
scope of copyright. Market-wide use of the term simultaneously
secures copyright's private benefits and contracts out of its public-
oriented limitations, and its judicial approval delegates to private
actors the power to set at naught long-established and accepted
copyright boundaries. 140 Among these boundaries are ones drawn
by such venerable precedents as Baker v. Seldenl41 and Hoehling
136. Id. at 1336 (quoting Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975
F.2d 832, 842 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
137. Id.
138. Id. Although not specifically referenced by Judge Dyk, the majority
concluded that the term unambiguously prohibited any and all methods of
computer program code reverse engineering. Id. at 1326; cf. Bonito Boats,
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989) (fact that state law
prohibits just one, not all, reverse engineering methods "does not eliminate
conflict with federal scheme").
139. Although he could have, he did not accentuate this by also noting the
§ 102(b) linkage with the First Amendment or competition policy.
140. ProCD is criticized on this same point by Nimmer. NIMMER, supra
note 90, § 3.04[B][3][a], at 3-34.10 (objecting that ProCD "upsets the delicate
balance in copyright law" by allowing computer program copyright owners to
economically exploit their copyright while simultaneously depriving users the
interests that copyright law itself confers on their usage).
141. 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (idea-expression dichotomy).
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v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 142 and expanded upon by Feist,
Computer Associates International v. Altai143 and Lotus Develop-
ment Corp. v. Borland International, Inc.'" ProCD accomplished
this by permitting standard form shrink-wrap contracts to accord
mere facts and their compilation greater protection than that
which copyright provides genuinely original works of authorship.
Bowers leapt to the other end of the spectrum, the patent law
boundary, by sanctioning use of contract to leverage copyright into
protection of computer program-embodied methods, processes,
other functional characteristics, know-how and the like. Yet Atari,
Lotus, Sony v. Connectix and other leading cases soundly condition
such protection on meeting the more demanding requirements of
patent law or dependence on more vulnerable state trade secret
law protection. 45
VI. BOWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL PREEMPTION
A. Bonito Boats and Patent Law Preemption
Long ago, in information technology era terms, this author
explored the possibility that Bonito Boats and its Kewanee, Sears
and Compco antecedents sounded the basis for patent law or,
more precisely, Supremacy Clause and Patent and Copyright
Clause conflict preemption of contract terms prohibiting computer
program code reverse engineering. 46 The thesis in this part is
142. 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980) (histori-
cal facts not protected by work's copyright).
143. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (computer program copyright infringe-
ment determination is possible only after first filtering out unprotected ele-
ments).
144. 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), affd, 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (section 102(b)
excludes methods of operation from a computer program's copyright protec-
tion).
145. The difference was captured by the Supreme Court in Kewanee, stat-
ing that "[wihere patent law acts as a barrier, trade secret law functions rela-
tively as a sieve." Kewanee Oil Corp. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490
(1974).
146. My original venture into the subject area was David A. Rice, Trade
Secret Clauses in Shrink-Wrap Licenses, 2 Computer Lawyer #2, at 17 (1985).
David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal Pre-
emption of Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U.
PITT. L. REV. 543 (1992), a far more extensive analysis, was published several
years later and that was followed by David A. Rice, Sega and Beyond: A Bea-
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that, if the issue had been squarely posed in Bowers, counsel
might have challenged the Federal Circuit and perhaps invited
the Supreme Court to quite differently view standard form shrink-
wrap term override of § 107 in general, or at least as interpreted
and applied in Atari and numerous other federal appellate court
decisions.
Baystate's counsel primarily focused on countering Bowers'
copyright infringement and breach of contract counterclaims with
what seemingly, and actually, were strong copyright and contract
arguments. 147 Judge Dyk similarly was compelled to focus on
those issues although his dissent showed that he viewed the case
and its implications in broader terms. Hinted, but not directly
presented, was the notion that Supreme Court patent law preemp-
tion decisions in Bonito Boats, Kewanee and their Sears Roebuck
and Compco antecedents presented a perhaps clearer and more
compelling Supremacy Clause preemption argument.
Bowers expanded the protection of patent law subject matter
through extension of copyright. Events subsequent to the Bonito
Boats, Kewanee, Sears, and Compco decisions make this even
more clear than at the time this author earlier addressed patent
law preemption of computer program reverse engineering prohibi-
tions. The Federal Circuit has now established that computer pro-
grams as such are patentable subject matter. 148 This makes
Bowers' effect on § 102(b), which deals in part with the interplay
and common border of copyright and patent, a call for revisiting
whether federal patent law preempts enforcement of computer
program copy license terms that prohibit reverse engineering of
computer program code.
Bonito Boats extensively discussed and reaffirmed Kewanee
and its examination of the relationship between federal patent
and state trade secret law. In the course of rejecting the claim that
federal patent law and policy preempts state trade secret law, Ke-
wanee considered alleged state and federal law conflict over a
con for Fair Use Analysis... At Least as Far as It Goes, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV.
1131 (1994).
147. See supra note 13 (concerning the timing and brevity of Baystate's
attention to conflict preemption as an alternative argument).
148. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Servs., Inc., 149 F.3d
1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); AT&T v. Excel Communications, 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
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range of subject matter. It began with that which is unpat-
entable 149 and ultimately proceeded to that which is patentable,
the one area in which trade secret law might encourage inventors
to withdraw from the patent system and its requirement of public
disclosure. Even though both state and federal law created inno-
vation incentives, the Court noted that trade secret law addition-
ally serves an important state interest in maintaining standards
of commercial ethics. It does so in liability rules addressed to dis-
closure in breach of confidence or discovery by dishonest, fraudu-
lent or other unfair means rather than by creating property
rights.150 Second, it emphasized that patent law provides an op-
portunity to obtain, for a limited term, an exclusive right to make,
use and sell even as it requires disclosure as a quid pro quo. In
contrast, trade secret protection is lost if the subject matter is dis-
closed or ascertained through a lawful means of discovery.151
Kewanee highlighted that reverse engineering is a "fair and
honest" means of discovery under state trade secret law. 52 Bonito
Boats emphasized this when dealing with a statute which, al-
though not barring all reverse engineering, banned the most effi-
cient method for reverse engineering an unpatented boat hull
design.1 53 Justice O'Connor emphasized that trade secret law in-
corporation of reverse engineering as a lawful means of discovery
importantly distinguished patent and trade secret law. First, it
did not channel innovation or inventions away from the patent
system. Second, it made trade secret law primarily a protection
against conduct that constituted unfair competition whereas pat-
ent law creates property rights as a means to promote inven-
tion. 54 Altering trade secret law would negate the first, at least
change the second, and present a direct conflict with patent law.
Notably, Justice O'Connor concluded that it was not sufficient to
149. For example, subject matter that could not meet the novelty and
nonobviousness requirements for a patent.
150. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484.
151. Id. at 490-91; see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141, 155 (noting that with respect to Kewanee it was central to the
Court's conclusion that trade secret protection is weaker than patent protec-
tion because trade secret law leaves the public "free to discover and exploit
the trade secret through reverse engineering" or independent discovery).
152. 416 U.S. at 476, 490.
153. 489 U.S. at 160.
154. Id. at 155-60, 162-64.
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avoid conflict preemption that the Florida statute did not prohibit
copying based on independent discovery or resort to other unpro-
hibited means of reverse engineering. 155 Consistent with this,
Sony v. Connectix rejected Sony's argument that § 107 of the
Copyright Act precludes reverse engineering that employs com-
puter program code decompilation or disassembly unless use of
lesser alternative means is shown to be unavailing.156
While neither the Kewanee nor Bonito Boats Courts dealt with
a contractual prohibition against reverse engineering, both em-
phasized that Sears and Compco made freedom to copy the consti-
tutional norm except as otherwise provided by federal law or state
law regulating fraud, deception, breach of confidence, breach of
trust, industrial espionage or the like. Those state interests are
not implicated in Bowers, ProCD or other instances of routine,
market-wide use of shrink-wrap contracts drawn by copyright
owners to alter and augment copyright in order to enhance protec-
tion against competition. Pursuing the latter is antithetical to na-
tional policy favoring competition. It also heavily touches upon the
Patent and Copyright Clause by constructing copyright-based pat-
ent-like protection without submitting to rigorous Patent Office
examination to determine if program-embodied § 102(b) subject
matter meets more demanding patent requirements. Finally, and
specific to trade secret law, Bowers sustained use of state contract
law to tinker with federal copyright law in a way that expands
state trade secret law protection well beyond that upheld against
constitutional attack in Kewanee.
In contrast to ProCD and Bowers, the Supreme Court rejects
foreclosure of competition as a constitutionally legitimate use of
state law to restrict or prohibit copying of patent subject matter
for which no patent has been granted. It is difficult to imagine
that the Court would countenance or could justify enforcement of
competition-preventing standard form shrink-wrap terms that re-
draw well-established copyright, patent and trade secret law
boundaries codified by Congress in § 102(b). It was precisely that
which Bonito Boats emphatically rejected when it strongly reaf-
firmed Sears and Compco and carefully explained the narrow lim-
its of permissible state law control over copying.
155. Id.
156. 203 F.3d 596, 604 (9th Cir. 1999).
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B. Non-Statutory Copyright Preemption
Professor Paul Goldstein offers a closely reasoned argument
for reaching beyond § 301 to consider the possibility of Supremacy
Clause preemption in the realm of copyright. 157 Professor Gold-
stein argues that § 301 did not fully exercise the power of Con-
gress under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution and
that Bonito Boats and its antecedent Supreme Court decisions in-
struct that the Supremacy Clause provides an independent basis
for state law preemption. 158 The thesis is that, like patent law and
policy, copyright law and policy establish non-statutory limits on
the power of individual states to enact or enforce laws that pro-
hibit copying, or prevent access to and use of, content not pro-
tected by copyright. This is supported by language in Sears and
Compco that treat patent and copyright alike based on the fact
that both are grounded in the Patent and Copyright Clause. 159
This was the bedrock of Judge Dyk's dissent. 60 He focused on
a direct conflict between state contract law and national policy as
expressed in federal copyright law rather than on parsing the lan-
guage and meaning of § 301(a).161 His discussion of Bonito Boats
concerned state law intrusion upon national law or, in this in-
stance, the use of state contract law to redefine the scope of copy-
157. Paul Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers
and Compulsory Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REV.
1107, 1122-23 (1977) and PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 3 COPYRIGHT § 15.3.3 (2d ed. 2001
Supp.). ProCD suggested the same view. 86 F.3d at 1453-55.
158. Goldstein, supra note 157, at 1122-23; see also Heald, supra note 3, at
994 (arguing that the Bonito Boats preemption rationale should be applied to
state laws which upset the balance struck by copyright law); Karjala, supra
note 123, at 533-34 (concluding that state law that frustrates the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress should be preempted); Maureen A.
O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright
Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479, 534-41 (1995) (not-
ing that Supremacy Clause preemption must be examined as well as statu-
tory preemption); Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property Protection And
Reverse Engineering Of Computer Programs In The United States And The
European Community, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 89-90 (1993) (stating that express
statutory preemption does not preclude Supremacy Clause preemption).
159. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230, 231 (1964);
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964).
160. Bowers argued in its Opposition to the Petition for Rehearing that
the copyright conflict preemption was not raised in a timely manner by Bay-
state. See Bower's Opposition to Rehearing Brief, supra note 13, at 15.
161. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1335 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
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right and the statutory rights of copyright owners. Judge Dyk saw
shrink-wrap contracts that prohibit computer program reverse
engineering as cutting to the very core of federal copyright law
and policy. He thereby shifted the focus from wooden application
of the extra element test, devised by the judiciary to address
equivalency of rights, to whether state contract law could be used
to subvert the § 301(a) declaration that the Copyright Act is the
exclusive source of copyright, sole determinant of its subject mat-
ter and scope, and arbiter of copyright owner and public rights.
Like patent law, copyright carves particular and limited ex-
ceptions to policies favoring competition, treatment of knowledge
and information as free for all to use, and freedom to copy. It is in-
strumental, providing limited exclusive rights only in the expres-
sion of ideas, and none at all in ideas or the methods, practices or
processes of their application. This limitation, and its constitu-
tional foundation, is recognized in other contemporary federal ap-
pellate court decisions. 162 Thus, in a different context, the Ninth
Circuit in Sony v. Connectix cited Bonito Boats when rejecting
Sony's efforts to distinguish prior computer program code reverse
engineering fair use precedents, stating as follows:
[Slome economic loss by Sony as a result of... competi-
tion [from those who reverse engineer] does not compel a
finding of no fair use. Sony understandably seeks control
over the market for devices that play games Sony pro-
duces or licenses. The copyright law, however, does not
confer such a monopoly.163
The court continued, quoting its earlier decision in Sega v. Ac-
colade:
An attempt to monopolize the market by making it im-
possible for others to compete runs counter to the statu-
tory purpose of promoting creative expression and cannot
constitute a strong equitable basis for resisting invocation
of the fair use doctrine. 16
162. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d
Cir. 1992); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995).
163. 203 F.3d at 607.
164. Id. at 607-08 (quoting Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d
1510, 1523-24 (9th Cir. 1992)).
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Finally, and referencing Bonito Boats, the Ninth Circuit ex-
plained, "[if] Sony wishes to obtain a lawful monopoly on the func-
tional concepts in its software, it must satisfy the more stringent
standards of the patent law."165
Constricted judicial reading of § 301(a) to narrowly bind its
operation obviously leaves more subject to the Supremacy Clause
as arbiter of alleged state law conflicts with federal copyright law
and policy. Prediction may be folly, yet Bowers and other decisions
that permit copyright owners to pick and choose beg Supremacy
Clause preemption scrutiny when contract and business practices
claim the benefits of copyright and, simultaneously, the freedom
to contractually opt out of statutory limitations that secure public
benefits. 166 Courts, such as the Bowers majority, that do this sub-
stantially remake the intellectual property law landscape, modify
state trade secret law in the form upheld in Kewanee, and revise
federal copyright law by expanding its protection and copyright
owner rights to include program-embodied ideas, procedures,
process, systems and methods of operation.
If the literal language of § 301(a) does not reach, the Suprem-
acy Clause, in conjunction with Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 and
the § 301(a) statement that the Copyright Act is the exclusive
source of protection for copyright subject matter, establishes that
federal law and policy is not hobbled by statutory language proc-
essed under judicially-fashioned decision aids and canons of statu-
tory interpretation.
VII. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Copyright creates limited rights in order "to encourage the
production of original works by protecting the expressive elements
while leaving the ideas, facts and functional concepts in the public
165. Id. at 605 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 160-61 (1989)). Bonito itself taught that unpatentable methods,
processes, and other such matter are free for use by all, subject only to alter-
native protection by state trade secret law, including its preemption-saving
recognition of reverse engineering as a lawful means of trade secret discov-
ery.
166. See David Nimmer, et al., The Metamorphosis of Copyright Into Ex-
pand, 87 CAL. L. REv. 17 (1999); David A. Rice, Copyright as Talisman: Ex-
panding 'Property' in Digital Works, 16 INT'L REV. OF LAW, COMPUTERS &
TECH. 113 (2002).
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domain for others to build on."167 Its schema, as presented in the
Constitution, is to create limited author's rights for a limited time
in order to promote creative activity in service of the ultimate aim
of "promoting broad public availability of literature, music and the
other arts."16 8 Recognition of even decompilation reverse engineer-
ing as a fair use emphasizes the public interest in and claim to
that knowledge.
Judicial respect for the exclusively statutory character of
copyright underpins the often expressed preference to leave im-
portant unsettled issues for Congress whenever that is possible.i6 9
The corollary expressed in Eldred v. Ashcroft is that courts must
strongly defer to what Congress has wrought.170 Bowers, like
ProCD, is no exemplar of these principles. It eschewed reading the
Copyright Act as a whole and unhesitatingly delegated to stan-
dard form shrink-wrap drafters the power to amend the Copyright
Act by overriding § 107 and striking the § 106 express "subject to"
reference to § 107. More importantly, it chose this with knowledge
that the real effect was to permit vendor-crafted shrink-wrap li-
cense term amendment of § 102(b) so as to expand copyright pro-
167. Sega Enters. Ltd., 977 F.2d at 1527. The realm of public interests and
use rights is called the "public domain." See generally COLLECTED PAPERS:
DuKE CONFERENCE ON THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (James Boyle ed. 2003); Yochai
Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 360-62 (1999); Jessica
Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L. REV. 965, 967-68 (1990). In contrast
to the ProCD and Bowers treatment of copyright as well as patent creating
strong proprietary rights good against the world, copyright and patent bal-
ance statutory private rights and public interests in access and use. This is
most clearly expressed in the patent law quid pro quo of disclosure and, more
particular to Bowers, the copyright law fair use doctrine and limitation of
copyright protection to only the author's expression of ideas, methods, proc-
esses, procedures and the like. It is obvious in that light that the copyright
law public interest or rights guarantees are not private rights of the kind be-
fore the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Canal Electric Co. v. West-
inghouse Electric Corp., 548 N.E.2d 182, 187-88 (Mass. 1990), the authority
cited by the Bowers majority as supporting freedom to contractually waive
the public protection established by § 107. Bowers, 320 F.2d at 1325.
168. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975);
see also Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1994); Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 784-85 (2003).
169. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990); Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989).
170. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 779, 785 (2003).
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tection for copyright-protected digital products 171 and, secondarily,
substantially alter state trade secret law. It approved use of con-
tract to leverage copyright into what one recent article has charac-
terized as "expand." 72 Despite that knowledge, it not once
considered the intent of Congress or, in broader terms, the very
explicit statement in § 301(a) that copyright is solely statutory
and federal.
The 1976 Copyright Act is a comprehensive statute enacted
pursuant to the Patent and Copyright Clause after years of prepa-
ration, extensive debate, negotiation and congressional delibera-
tion.173 Perhaps the Bowers majority was so strongly swayed by
Judge Easterbrook's animating notion that contract and vendor
freedom with its use is the strongest of all public policies, one
paramount even to federal legislation enacted pursuant to an ex-
press Article I power. 7 4 It is quite to the contrary in contract law,
including its expression in the cases cited and relied upon by the
Bowers majority, when enforcement would violate public policy. In
that context, relevant and not just directly superceding federal or
state legislation ranks below only the federal or a state constitu-
tion and well above contract or other private law as a source of
applicable public policy. 175 The relevant sources of public policy in
this instance are Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Consti-
tution and the 1976 Copyright Act and their protection of public
interests.
The core of the latter is the § 102 definition of the scope and
limits of copyright and its protection. It is the cornerstone of the
171. Knowledge is attributed based on the fact that Judge Dyk changed
and explained his position on rehearing, and on the author's review of briefs
submitted to the Federal Circuit for its consideration on rehearing.
172. Nimmer, supra note 166; see also, Rice, supra note 166.
173. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 462,
n.9 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
174. See Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc. for suggestion of this view.
320 F.3d 1317, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
175. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §§ 178-179 (1978). Well before
the ProCD decision and the Federal Circuit decision in Bowers, Ray Patter-
son and Stanley Lindberg expressed the view that standard form shrink-
wrap licenses are almost surely against public policy as unilateral attempts
to override public law with private law in an adhesion contract. L. RAY
PArERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT 220 (1991).
One can be sure that to the extent the provisions of such licenses preclude
fair use of the work, they have no legal effect, although their in terrorem ef-
fect may be substantial.
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"copyright bargain" and marks the boundaries of copyright protec-
tion vis a vis patent and other intellectual property law, and also
that which is wholly within the public domain and free to copy.
Copyright owner rights have meaning only in reference to § 102,
and those rights are expressly subject to or shaped by the fair use
and other statutory limitations.
Copyright is exclusively statutory and it is presumptively out-
side the province of the courts or copyright owners to effectively
amend the statute. This must be particularly so where amend-
ment is accomplished by standard form contracts and terms that
are routinely used market-wide to redefine the scope of copyright
protection in service of copyright owner interests. Bowers is, in
that regard, the best evidence of ProCD's disposition and reason-
ing concerning vendor freedom with contract and creation of a vir-
tual presumption that standard form shrink-wrap contracts and
terms lie beyond § 301(a) or other preemption. ProCD was the
springboard for the Bowers majority to perfunctorily conclude that
if § 301(a) does not preempt use of shrink-wrap standard form
contract terms to circumvent Feist, then a fortiori it does not pre-
empt use of standard form terms to circumvent a particular or, by
extension, any statutory fair use limitation on the rights of copy-
right owners. 176 This, like ProCD, strongly manifested a recent ju-
dicial as well as digital product distributors' tendency toward
176. Judge Dyk surmised that the majority's rationale would permit a
standard form shrink-wrap contract to nullify any § 107 to § 120 limitation
on the rights of copyright owners. His principal example was the first sale
doctrine codified in § 109(a) which is already a matter of controversy. Pur-
ported licensing of the use of individual copies rather than selling them is in-
tended to have precisely the effect of circumventing § 109(a) for the purpose
of using contract terms to restrict uses and prohibit copy transfer. David A.
Rice, Licensing the Use of Computer Program Copies and the Copyright Act
First Sale Doctrine, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 157, 157-59 (1990); Lothar Determann
& Aaron Fellmeth, Don't Judge a Sale by Its License: Software Transfers Un-
der the First Sale Doctrine in the United States and the European Commu-
nity, 36 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2001). While some cases accept this
without question, there is a division. One recent decision expressly rejected
vendor characterization as a "license" as legally dispositive. Looking to the
realities of the transaction, the court concluded it was functionally a "sale"
and therefore held that a computer program copy shrink-wrap license term
that prohibited copy transfer did not vest the copyright owner with continu-
ing authority to control downstream transfer. See Softman Prods., LLC v.
Adobe Sys., Inc, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
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increasingly treating copyright as truly "property-like" in an abso-
lute sense.
Equally, but only with respect to computer programs, Bowers
substantially altered state trade secret law by upholding state
contract law transformation of reverse engineering from a lawful
into an impermissible means of discovery. This was contrary to
Bonito Boats and the reasons articulated in Kewanee when the
Court sustained state trade secret law against constitutional chal-
lenge. It also is highly unlikely that a state court would enforce
such a mass-market contract term as a matter of state law. State
common law and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, now enacted in
more than forty states, expressly make reverse engineering a law-
ful means of trade secret discovery. 177 Contracting out of this, ex-
cept in an employer-employee or truly two-party nondisclosure
agreement, would risk challenge under Bonito and Kewanee and
invite contest as against state public policy.
Judge Easterbrook's ProCD opinion is often criticized by legal
scholars but, as it was in Bowers, often embraced by other courts
without reflection. Even so, most decisions that follow ProCD con-
cern state contract law enforceability of shrink-wrap contracts and
especially terms provided on a "money now, terms later" basis, an
issue not before the court in Bowers. Instead, the majority fol-
lowed ProCD on its second issue, whether a term contained in a
computer program copy shrink-wrap license agreement is subject
to copyright law preemption.
Preemption is, of course, a blunt instrument.178 On the other
hand, even legislation that depends on case-by-case application by
the courts is blunt. The Copyright Act, though it leaves much to
case-by-case application, speaks clearly. Sections 106 and 107 in-
177. Concerning the common law, see the discussion in Kewanee. 416 U.S.
470, 490 (1974); see also Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Dev. Indus., Inc., 925
F.2d 174, 178-80 (7th Cir. 1991); Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400,
404 (9th Cir. 1991); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d
1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1970). The rule is codified in section 1 of the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1)-(2) (amended 1985), 14
U.L.A. 437 (1979) (as explained in comment 1 to section 1); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995).
178. This has been emphasized by other authors who have dealt with the
copyright and contract intersection. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 110, at 136;
J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual
Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Goods Uses of
Information, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 875, 920-22 (1999).
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clude express cross-references, effectively making the two as one
to strike a balance between exclusively statutory private rights
and public interests.179 Section 102(b) prescribes that copyright for
an original work of authorship "[iun no case... extend[s] to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle or discovery... embodied in such a work." Similarly, al-
beit no model of statutory clarity, § 301(a) unmistakably expresses
the fundamental intent that the 1976 Act is the exclusive source of
copyright and that no such right or its equivalent may be claimed
under state common law or statute. It defies imagination that
Congress intended, but did not state, that general contract law
and the Uniform Commercial Code could be used to enforce stan-
dard form, market-wide "private legislation" to repeal § 107 and,
with that, effectively rewrite § 102(b).180
Theoretically, the two-party paradigm of neo-classical con-
tract is not a blunt instrument. On the other hand, when it is used
under the guise of "freedom of contract" to justify "freedom with
contract" to go well beyond securing the efficiency of standardizing
terms and risk, it is blunt. The extreme of rewriting, with market-
wide effect, statutes enacted by Congress or state legislatures so
as to claim their private benefits and then enhance them by negat-
ing intended public benefits of the same legislation, dramatically
exemplifies this potential. In this instance the business method
was not used just to snuff § 107, but to even more brazenly rede-
fine what copyright protects so as to broaden the reach of the
solely statutory rights of copyright owners. The exclusive power to
do this lies with Congress, not standard form shrink-wrap con-
tract drafters or even the judiciary.1 8
179. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
447 (1984); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
546-47 (1985); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 (11th Cir.
1996).
180. The late Professor Freidrich Kessler was the first to introduce the
"private legislation" notion in his seminal work on adhesion contracts. Frie-
drich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
181. Merges, supra note 123, at 1613; Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a
Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L.J. 283, 383-85 (1996).
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Other proffered alternatives to preemption, though not blunt,
are more nuanced and also attractive in some respects. 8 2 Each,
however, has its own limits as effective approaches, largely be-
cause they often would require fact-intensive adjudication in their
application. The copyright misuse doctrine, considered as one al-
ternative by Mark A. Lemley, 83 is now generally recognized but
sparingly applied by the courts.1M Maureen A. O'Rourke has pro-
posed an alternative market-based approach drawn to competition
policy and basic principles and methodologies of antitrust law. 85
Review of either is beyond the scope of this Article, but a principal
drawback of both is the necessity of case-by-case litigation, a con-
dition that introduces uncertainty and litigation cost barriers that
foreclose relief for most retail market licensees and small busi-
nesses.
186
182. The question that I found most difficult to resolve when addressing
copyright preemption of contract terms was whether commercial contract
terms prohibiting computer program code reverse engineering should be held
preempted by federal copyright law. See Rice, supra note 87, at 627-28. After
further consideration, I since have rejected my tentative original "yes" posi-
tion in favor of "it depends." This expresses, in accord with Judge Dyk in
Bowers, that such a term in a truly negotiated agreement could be enforced in
circumstances where it did not otherwise do violence to federal copyright law
and policy. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1336. At the same time, it reflects my view
that the mere fact that a transaction is commercial ought not to foreclose the
possibility of preemption. Other leading scholars have expressed similar
views since 1992, beginning with Maureen A. O'Rourke who, in 1995, ex-
pressly challenged my originally expressed view. See O'Rourke, supra note
158, at 522 n.193; see also Lemley, supra note 110; Scotchmer, supra note 3.
183. Lemley, supra note 110, at 151. See also Marshall Leaffer, Engineer-
ing Competitive Policy and Copyright Misuse, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1087
(1994) (discussing and rejecting justification of reverse engineering based on
copyright misuse doctrine); Reichman, supra note 178, at 923-24 (discussing
limitations of copyright misuse).
184. One relatively recent and particularly prominent application was by
the Fifth Circuit in Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 166 F.3d 772,
792-95 (5th Cir. 1999).
185. Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A
Market-Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53, 87-90 (1997).
186. While most business or commercial licensees presumably are finan-
cially more able than consumer end-users to litigate, most small to medium
size businesses and small professional practices will be financially incapable
of litigating against major vendors of computer program copies and other
digital products. See David A. Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and
the Duality of Consumer Transaction Problems, 48 B.U. L. REV. 559, 567-69
(1968).
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Debates about bluntness or nuance aside, one alternative is
totally unacceptable. Judicial consideration and weighing of the
necessity or rationality of copyright owners' business practices
standing alone 8 7 is not justification for judicial delegation of a
power to self-interestedly supercede, annul or redraw what Con-
gress, or for that matter a state legislature, has enacted in its rep-
resentative capacity. 88 Even worse is a court doing this while
187. Judge Easterbrook in ProCD advanced resulting price and other pos-
sible consumer benefits as a reason for holding the contract term enforceable
under state law and not preempted by federal copyright law. Neither the
Wisconsin statute, Copyright Act nor U.S. Constitution made that a factor for
judicial consideration. Moreover, the conclusory assertions are more off-the-
cuff speculation and rationalization than reasoned and probative economic
analysis. Cf. O'Rourke, supra note 185, at 62-63 (describing ProCD argument
for enforceability as, in part, "a more sophisticated economic approach"). Con-
sistent therewith, Judge Easterbrook's accompanying legal reasoning, though
topsy-turvy, misstated "Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. holds that contracts
about trade secrets may be enforced," 86 F.3d at 1454 (citation omitted), and
stated in dictum that "[t]o the extent licenses facilitate distribution of object
code while concealing the source code (the point of a clause forbidding disas-
sembly), they serve the same procompetitive functions as does the law of
trade secrets." Id. at 1455 (citing to Rockwell Graphics Sys., Inc. v. DEV In-
dus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991)). Kewanee did not so hold. Fur-
thermore, Rockwell concerned employer-employee confidentiality and
nondisclosure agreements regarding technical drawings for machining re-
placement parts not susceptible to duplication based on reverse engineering.
In addition to being irrelevant on its facts, Rockwell in fact generally treated
the employee agreements as enforceable, but not so if the trial court on re-
mand determined that Rockwell had not taken adequate safeguards to pro-
tect its trade secrets in connection with its own business-related disclosures
to third parties. Id. at 177-80. It is even more discouraging to see such blithe
judicial misuse of legal authority to create an illusion of "legal reasoning"
than a court's use of so obviously speculative and superficial "economic analy-
sis."
188. The reference to state legislation particularly concerns ProCD and its
outcome-justifying interpretation of the Wisconsin Uniform Commercial Code
without any consideration of relevant Wisconsin appellate court decisions,
state legislative history documents, or the judicially declared principle that
Wisconsin courts emphasize uniformity of law when interpreting and apply-
ing its Uniform Commercial Code in dealing with issues of first impression.
See Belke v. M&I First Nat'l Bank of Stevens Point, 525 N.W.2d 737, 739
(Wis. Ct. App. 1994). This principle presumably would incline a Wisconsin
appellate court toward following Step-Saver and Arizona Retail unless the
court was convinced that the out-of-state decisions were wrong. Putting a
point on it all, Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), requires a fed-
eral court to follow, not ignore or remake, state statutes and judicial decisions
in deciding state law issues, including decisions that establish guiding prin-
ciples for interpretation of a state's Uniform Commercial Code. See, e.g.,
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wearing blinders. Digital product vendor survival is not dependent
on enforcing all business practices or contract terms that they pre-
fer. United States computer program copy and database product
vendors are subject in Europe, Australia, and elsewhere to laws
that regulate and proscribe contract terms, including but not lim-
ited to ones that prohibit reverse engineering of computer pro-
gram code.189 Vendors have not found this so compromising that
the unavailability of what they claim absolutely necessary in cases
Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Indus., Inc., 29 F.3d 1173, 1178 (7th Cir. 1994)
(reasoning that, despite court's preference for minority rule, Illinois judicial
decisions create presumption that Illinois will adopt majority view on UCC
section 2-207 issue based on UCC section 1-102 policy of promoting uniform-
ity in law, and presumption was not rebutted).
189. Most closely related to Bowers is that the European Council Software
Directive secures the right, without copyright owner authorization, to "study
or test the functioning of the program in order to determine the ideas and
principles which underlie any element of the program" while performing any
act to which the user is entitled. Council Directive 91/250 of 14 May 1991 on
the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, art. 5(3), 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42.
Specific to decompilation, the Directive states that it is permissible to repro-
duce code and translate its form when it is "indispensable to obtain informa-
tion necessary to achieve the interoperability of an independently created
computer program with other programs" so long as that information is not
given to others except within the purpose quoted above, and not used to de-
velop, produce, or market a program that infringes the expression protected
by copyright. Id. art. 6. Finally, article 9 of the Directive makes null and void
any contractual provisions that are contrary to article 6 or the exceptions
stated in article 5(2) and (3). Id. art. 9(1).
Of more general application is Council Directive 93/13 of 05 April 1993
on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, art. 3(1), 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29
(applicable to contracts that have not been individually negotiated and a
term causes a significant imbalance of the parties' rights and obligations
under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer). The same article
declares that the first condition is always satisfied if the contract "has been
drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to influence
the substance of the term, particularly in the context of pre-formulated
standard contract." Id. art. 3(2). The general standard of "unfair" is defined in
article 2. Certain types of terms defined with reference to their objects or
effects are listed in an Annex to which article 3.3 refers in stating that that
they are indicative but non-exhaustive of terms that Members must prohibit
or regulate, including Annex 1(i) which includes "irrevocably binding the
consumer to terms with which he had no real opportunity of becoming
acquainted before the conclusion of the contract". Article 4 sets forth general
guidelines for determining if a term is "unfair." An important instance of
judicial determination by the House of Lords of the meaning of "unfair" under
the United Kingdom's implementation, the Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts Regulation, is Dir. Gen. of Fair Trading v. First Nat'l Bank Plc, 1
A.C. 481 (H.L. 2002).
COPYRIGHT AND CONTRACT
such as ProCD and Bowers has caused them to withdraw from
those markets. Similar legislation exists in other countries. 190
Other European legal measures regulate or prohibit terms often
included in United States market shrink-wrap licenses' 91 and a
recent Australian Copyright Law Review Commission report
strongly recommended the Copyright Act be amended to prevent
use of contract to negate statutory exceptions that are "permitted
purposes" safeguarded by § 116(a) of the Act, including, under sec-
tion 47B, access and temporary reproduction for the purposes of
achieving interoperability with a computer program protected by
effective technological means. 92 Additionally, it is common outside
the United States to find administratively implemented unfair
contract terms legislation addressed primarily to take-it-or-leave
it standard form terms generally. 93
Bowers and ProCD demonstrate above all that even promi-
nent courts, and certainly vendors' legal counsel, lack the omnis-
cience, perspective and representative responsibility and role of
Congress to superimpose their judgment and will for the law and
policy set forth in the 1976 Copyright Act after twenty years of
preparatory work, discussion and negotiation. Even more certain
is that neither is at liberty to legislate with disregard for the Pat-
ent and Copyright Clause and the Supremacy Clause as inter-
preted in close context by the Supreme Court. Judge Dyk,
although in some respects not fully developing his arguments and
not clearly distinguishing between § 301(a) and constitutional
preemption, recognized this in principle. In addition, his identifi-
190. JONATHAN BAND & MASANOBU KATOH, INTERFACES ON TRIAL:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTEROPERABILITY IN THE GLOBAL SOFTWARE
INDUSTRY 258-62 (1995); Lemley, supra note 54, at 1253 n.53 (providing a
country-by-country listing on enforceability of shrink-wrap licenses and
terms drawn from 2 AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION,
SOFTWARE LICENSING COMPENDIUM 35 (1992)).
191. Thomas Hoeren, The European Union Commission and Recent
Trends in European Information Law, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH L.J. 1,
13-14 (2003).
192. Copyright Law Review Committee, at http://www.ag.gov.au/www/clr
Home.nsf (last visited October 28, 2003). The Committee is a part-time spe-
cialist advisory group appointed by the Attorney General of Australia. Its
function is to study and report on specific copyright issues referred to it by
the government. Id.
193. Council Directive 93/13 of 05 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Con-
sumer Contracts, art. 3(1), 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29.
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cation of consequences attendant to the majority's refusal to sub-
stantially consider federal preemption did more than highlight
prospective effects of the decision as precedent. It demonstrated
the essential wisdom of separation of powers as a constraint on
the judiciary rather than just an independent judiciary's con-
straint on Congress and the Executive.
Prediction, as stated before, may be folly, and especially so in
a fast-developing and still nascent area of the law. In this in-
stance, however, the risk seems rather low. The legal reasons for
rejecting Bowers and its startling statute-preemption effects are
compelling. Fortunately, the majority decision is not binding in
any other federal circuit because the issue was one of copyright
rather than patent law. Just as a Wisconsin state court after
ProCD may reject the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Wiscon-
sin's Uniform Commercial Code, even the First Circuit is free to
disapprove the Bowers majority's misreading or misapplication of
Massachusetts law (Beacon Hill and Canal Electric) and its selec-
tive and superficial application of First Circuit law (Data General).
More importantly, all federal courts remain free to reject and cor-
rect the legal errors and perverse consequences of Bowers. The re-
sulting circuit conflict would present the Supreme Court with an
opportunity to restore federal copyright law to its proper status vis
a vis state contract law. Alternatively, perhaps Congress itself
may be moved some day to affirm that it meant what it enacted in
§ 107 and § 102(b) and will not abide self-interested private party
or judicial arrogation of flat-out legislative revision in the guise of
statutory interpretation and statute-based adjudication. Whether
the correction emanates from the Court or Congress, its message
will be that federal courts must refrain from complicity with copy-
right owners' presumptuously preemptive misuse of state contract
law to substantially enlarge their substantial but limited statu-
tory rights by diminishing or zeroing out intended public benefits
of copyright.
